Cascadia Rising: Cascadia Subduction Zone Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Functional Excercise Scenario Document by Paci-Green, Rebekah et al.
Western Washington University
Western CEDAR
Environmental Studies Faculty and Staff
Publications Environmental Studies
1-2015
Cascadia Rising: Cascadia Subduction Zone
Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Functional
Excercise Scenario Document
Rebekah Paci-Green





Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/envs_facpubs
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Environmental Studies at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Environmental Studies Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact
westerncedar@wwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paci-Green, Rebekah; Boles, Natalie; Black, Tyler; Smith, Karissa; and Munkh-Erdene, Enkhbayar, "Cascadia Rising: Cascadia
Subduction Zone Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Functional Excercise Scenario Document" (2015). Environmental Studies
Faculty and Staff Publications. 28.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/envs_facpubs/28
E X E R C I S E  S C E N A R I O  D O C U M E N T
Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ)





Ta b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
Foreword 
Background 
Exercise Facts and Assumptions 
Disclaimer 
Methodology 
Cascadia Region Overview 
Cascadia Subduction Zone 












Washington: Injuries and Fatalities

































Seattle Metro: Roads and Bridges
Oregon: Road Bridges
















Washington: Natural Gas Systems
Oregon: Natural Gas Systems
Refined Fuel Systems

























Ta b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
3
Ta b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
Oregon: Refined Fuel Systems 
Critical Public Safety Facilities 
Emergency Operation Centers 
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) 
Fire Stations 
Washington: Fire Stations 
Oregon: Fire Stations









Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities
Washington: Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities
Oregon: Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities
Hazardous Materials Facilities
Washington: Hazardous Materials Facilities
Oregon: Hazardous Materials Facilities
Communications Systems
































Appendix A: Report Contributors









Ta b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
5
F o r e w o r d
A large magnitude Cascadia Subduction Zone fault earthquake and tsunami is perhaps one of the most 
complex disaster scenarios that we face as emergency management and public safety officials in the Pacific 
Northwest. Due to this complexity, life-saving and life-sustaining response operations will hinge on the 
effective coordination and integration of governments at all levels – cities, counties, state agencies, federal 
departments, the military, and tribal nations – as well as non-governmental organizations and the private 
sector. It is this joint-operational whole community approach that we seek to enhance and test during the 
Cascading Rising exercise. 
Our sincere appreciation to the Western Washington University Resilience Institute and the members of 
the exercise Scenario Sub-Working Group for developing this foundational Exercise Scenario document. 
We look forward to commencing the design and preparations of the Cascadia Rising exercise, as we work 
together to improve our joint operational readiness to serve the citizens and the region that we all cherish.
Respectfully,
The Washington and Oregon Whole Community Exercise Design Committee
January 2015
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B a c k g r o u n d
E x e r c i s e  F a c t s
a n d  A s s u m p t i o n s
D i s c l a i m e r
Cascadia Rising is a four day 
Functional Exercise occurring the 
week of June 6, 2016. Participat-
ing Emergency Operation and 
Coordination Centers (EOC/
ECCs) at all levels of government 
and the private sector in Wash-
ington and Oregon will activate 
to coordinate simulated field 
response operations, both within 
their jurisdictions and also with 
neighboring communities, the 
State EOCs, FEMA, and major 
military commands.  
The purpose of this scenario pub-
lication is two-fold: (1) to provide 
information for exercise partic-
ipants on the potential impacts 
resulting from a large magnitude 
Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
earthquake and tsunami, pre-
paring exercise players for some 
of the challenges they may face 
during the exercise; and, (2) to 
provide exercise planner “trusted 
agents” with information on CSZ 
damages, assisting them in the 
preparation of various exercise 
design products to include in a 
“Ground Truth” document and 
the “Master Scenario Events List.”
The estimates of earthquake im-
pacts presented in this publication 
were produced using loss estima-
tion modeling software based on 
current scientific and engineering 
knowledge. There are uncertain-
ties inherent in any loss estimation 
technique. Therefore, there may 
be notable differences between 
the modeled results contained in 
this publication and other earth-
quake and tsunami loss models/
studies. The information in this 
report is not predictive; there may 
be significant differences between 
the modeled results in this publi-
cation and actual losses following 
a real-world Cascadia Subduction 
Zone earthquake and tsunami.
In order to achieve the joint ob-
jectives of the exercise, the follow-
ing exercise facts and assumptions 
should be used by both exercise 
planners and players in the con-
duct of the exercise:
• Real-world weather will be in 
effect during each day of the 
exercise.
• Emergency Operation and Co-
ordination Centers (EOC/ECCs) 
are structurally sound and capable 
of facilitating operations (unless 
otherwise determined by individ-
ual communities).
• A sufficient number of staff will 
be able to reach respective EOC/
ECCs to initiate and sustain 
operations (unless otherwise 
determined by individual commu-
nities)
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M e t h o d o l o g y
Data taken from several reports 
and studies were compiled to 
develop this Cascadia Rising 
Exercise Scenario Document. 
The Analytical Baseline Study 
for the Cascadia Earthquake and 
Tsunami, a 2011 study commis-
sioned by FEMA Region 10 and 
conducted by the National Infra-
structure Simulation and Analysis 
Center Homeland Infrastructure 
Threat and Risk Analysis Center 
(HITRAC) within the DHS Of-
fice of Infrastructure Protection, 
provides a primary foundation for 
estimating the impacts of a Casca-
dia Subduction Zone earthquake. 
The HITRAC study is based upon 
a 9.0 magnitude earthquake along 
the length of the Cascadia Sub-
duction Zone fault as specified by 
the Cascadia Region Earthquake 
Workgroup (CREW). The study 
assumes an epicenter approxi-
mately 95 miles west of Eugene, 
Oregon triggers a tsunami which 
impacts not only the West Coast, 
but the entire Pacific Basin. 
To understand potential losses 
caused by this large earthquake, 
HITRAC used FEMA’s HAZUS-
MH 2.0 Multi-hazard Loss 
Estimation Methodology tool. 
The tool considered the effects of 
ground shaking, liquefaction, and 
potential landslides on communi-
ties and their built environment. 
This Scenario Document also 
draws from the FEMA Region 
10 Response Plan that developed 
out of a multi-year, multiregion-
al planning process based upon 
the HITRAC baseline study. The 
sections here on geology, tsuna-
mi generation and generalized 
building damage also draw di-
rectly from CREW’s description 
of a Cascadia Subduction Zone 
earthquake and tsunami in their 
2013 updated scenario report. 
Oregon has undergone an exten-
sive resilience planning process 
and their 2013 Reducing Risk and 
Improving Recovery for the Next 
Cascadia Earthquake and Tsuna-
mi report added further specificity 
and accuracy to descriptions of 
damage in that state. Several pub-
lished reports and ongoing studies 
on tsunami evacuation were also 
used to provide better estimates 
of tsunami-related injuries and 
fatalities.
Loss estimation does not provide 
definitive results. Rather, estima-
tions are couched in probabilities 
of infrastructure experiencing a 
set of specified damage states. The 
narrative for this Cascadia Ris-
ing exercise relies upon the 90th 
percentile damage – the damage 
state with only a 10 percent esti-
mated chance of being exceeded. 
By using a worst case scenario 
model, it accounts for some of the 
potential compounding effects of 
aftershocks and landslide impacts 
that are not well-captured by the 
HAZUS-MH 2.0 tool. Thus, the 
damage estimates outlined in this 
report should be considered as 
potentially less than the 90th per-
centile of the scenario event and 
all subsequent secondary events 
that are likely to occur following 
the modeled Cascadia Subduction 
Zone earthquake.
Further, the fragility curves for 
tall buildings are not well under-
stood for prolonged shaking (4-6 
minutes). Therefore, the accuracy 
of structural damage modeling 
may vary by building type. How-
ever, despite these limitations, the 
HAZUS-MH 2.0 model provides 
the most credible estimate of 
aggregate losses to date. Addi-
tional damage data from actual 
earthquakes will improve future 
HAZUS-MH models. 
Damage estimates in this Scenario 
Document are provided for the 
purposes of the Cascadia Rising 
functional exercise, based upon 
modeling of a seismic event of a 
particular magnitude, location 
and faulting mechanism. They 
should not be read as a definitive 
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statement of likely damages from 
any one of many possible Cas-
cadia Subduction Zone events. 
To reinforce the limits of this 
loss estimation, all quantities 
in the Cascadia Rising Scenario 
Document have been rounded 
or given in broad ranges and, for 
most types of damages, provided 
for broad infrastructure sector 
categories, rather than damages at 
specific facilities. 
Damages to the infrastructure sec-
tors described herein are broken 
into three broad categories:  low, 
medium, and high damage. While 
broad, these categories provide 
a general indication of the func-
tionality of the infrastructure. In 
general, infrastructure with low 
damage is likely to have only deg-
radation of functionality. Much 
of this damaged infrastructure 
will be immediately usable in the 
response to the Cascadia event, 
though no infrastructure func-
tions in isolation. Infrastructure 
with medium damage is likely to 
require substantial repairs follow-
ing the Cascadia event. Medium 
damage indicates a degraded 
functionality or facilities that 
cannot be immediately occupied 
or utilized without at least tem-
porary repairs. Infrastructure in 
the high damage category may 
have some functionality, but 
may require extensive repairs or 
even full replacement to regain 
pre-event functionality. Table 1 
shows the estimated percentage 
of damage for each corresponding 
damage state. In all cases, damages 
to energy, transportation, fuel, 
communications and other infra-
structure systems and networks 
may degrade functionality of 
other infrastructures and physical 
systems independent of immedi-
ate damage to the infrastructure 
component in question.
Injuries and fatality estimates 
from the Cascadia Rising tsunami 
event are particularly challenging 
to estimate. To date, HAZUS-
MH 2.0 does not include a 
tsunami loss estimation module; 
it estimates only fatalities and 
injuries from earthquake shaking, 
including co-occurring landslides
and liquefaction. Furthermore,











one or more maps displaying the 
location of the damaged critical 
facility, and a table displaying the 
distribution of damage states by 
Areas of Operation. The geogra-
phy of Washington and Oregon 
creates three distinct Areas of 
Operation defined as follows: 
1)  Coastal: Area between the Pa-
cific Ocean and the Coast Moun-
tain Ranges.
2)  I-5 corridor: Area between the 
Coast Ranges and the Cascade 
Mountains
3) East: Area east of the Cascade 
Mountains
Because shaking intensities de-
crease rapidly east of the Cascade 
Mountains, direct damages to the 
eastern portion of the Washington 
and Oregon were not calculated. 
These eastern regions will, howev-
er, be impacted by an event of this 
size. Not only will they be an im-
portant response resource for the 
heavily impacted western regions, 
the interconnectivity of critical 
infrastructures such as transpor-
tation and energy may result in 
degraded services even for com-
munities in the eastern portions of 
the two states.
While all of these documents 
are useful for understanding the 
potential effects of a subduction 
earthquake, their analysis only 
provides a general assessment 
of how the area might fare in a 
9.0-magnitude earthquake. Be-
cause there are so many variables 
in earthquake and tsunami events, 
the actual event will undoubted-
ly be different than the scenario 
on which this analysis is based. 
Furthermore, these documents 
provide only an initial estimate 
of impacts; they do not factor in 
additional impacts from successive 
aftershocks. 
The information presented in 
this Scenario Document presents 
a snapshot in time based on the 
analyses of data currently avail-
able. Ongoing research on the 
CSZ fault system and the impacts 
of seismic shaking and inundation 
on communities and their built 
environment may not be reflected 
in this report.
Each critical infrastructure system 
includes a regional overview of 
impacts, a table describing each 
damage state level, and photos of 
damage. Impacts for both Wash-
ington and Oregon are included 
as subsections within each critical 
infrastructure section. Each state 
subsection includes a short nar-
rative describing state impacts, 
the HITRAC study originally 
estimated tsunami injuries and 
fatalities based upon a limited 
number of study areas, not the 
entirety of the Washington and 
Oregon coasts. 
To provide more robust estimates 
of these losses, this Scenario 
Document relies upon evacua-
tion studies conducted in 2013 
by Wood, Jones, Spielman, and 
Schmidtlein. These studies quan-
tify the number of facilities and 
residents in the inundation zone 
and estimate the number and 
percentage of individuals that 
will be able to walk out of the 
inundation zone before the waves 
arrive. For this scenario docu-
ment, residents in the inundation 
zone were assumed to evacuate at 
a slow walk, a speed that appears 
accurate in other tsunami events 
and may help account for initial 
disorientation, injury and damage 
to evacuation routes. 
While the 2013 evacuation studies 
provide estimates of fatalities, 
they do not provide information 
on tsunami-related injuries. To 
provide a rough estimate of tsuna-
mi-related injuries, this Scenario 
Document uses the FEMA Region 
10 CSZ Response Plan estimates, 
but increases them proportion-
ally to the ratio of the evacua-
tion study fatalities to HITRAC 
fatalities.  
M e t h o d o l o g y  ( c o n t. )
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C a s c a d i a  R e g i o n  O v e r v i e w
The sections on the Cascadia region; 
subduction zone; tsunami; after-
shocks; landslides and liquefaction; 
and future risks are based upon a 
Cascadia Region Earthquake Work-
ing group (CREW) report describ-
ing the Cascadia Subduction Zone 
earthquake scenario. CREW has 
kindly provided permission for their 
reprint here, with minor modifica-
tion. For the full text, see their 2013 
report.
The Cascadia Region is comprised 
of the area west of the Cascade 
Mountains stretching from 
Northern California, through 
Oregon and Washington and into 
British Columbia. This region, 
known for its stunning mountain 
ranges, rich farmlands and vine-
yards, beautiful beaches, great 
rivers, and green forests, is also 
home to many vibrant communi-
ties, bustling international ports, 
and thriving businesses. Residents 
and visitors alike enjoy the cultur-
al offerings of Cascadia’s cities and 
the diversity of outdoor activities 
in its natural areas. But the geo-
logic forces that shaped the Pacific 
Northwest are still active: Casca-
dia is a region of earthquakes.
More than 8 million people live 
and work within the projected 
CSZ earthquake damage zone 
in Washington and Oregon.i Of 
these, over 6 million people reside 
in urban areas.ii The region is 
also home to some of the nation’s 
most iconic companies and largest 
employers including Boeing, Mi-
crosoft, Starbucks, Amazon, Nike 
and many others. When com-
bined, the Seattle and Portland 
Metropolitan Areas alone repre-
sent the sixth largest metro area by 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 
the United States at nearly $450 
billion dollars annually.iii Vancou-
ver, British Columbia is the third 
largest city in Canada by nominal 
GDP at just over $100 billion 
dollars annually.iv
The Cascadia Region boasts a 
tremendously talented and ed-
ucated workforce across many 
sectors. Amongst U.S. cities, 
Seattle ranks first in the nation in 
educational attainment based on 
the number of residents with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher at 52 
percent. Portland is not far behind 
at eighth and 40 percent respec-
tively.v Some experts and histor-
ical events suggest that a lengthy 
post-earthquake recovery period 
could result in a sharp reduction 
in the region’s skilled workforce as 
residents relocate to other states 
and provinces. This phenomenon 
may be the result of individual 
decision making, or the result of 
corporate relocation (both tempo-
rary and permanent).
The Pacific Northwest is one of 
the preeminent tourist destina-
tions for both domestic and inter-
national travelers. While this is a 
positive for the region’s economy, 
it complicates disaster response 
efforts, especially those which 
would be required in the after-
math of a catastrophic event like 
a major CSZ earthquake. Wash-
ington State ranked thirteenth in 
the U.S. for overseas visitors in 
2010 at approximately 501,000 
with the Seattle Metropolitan 
Area receiving approximately 95 
percent of this total.vi The Blaine, 
Washington U.S. - Canadian 
land-passenger gateway is the 
eighth busiest international border 
crossing in the United States with 
just shy of 7 million personal 
vehicle passengers received annu-
ally.vii
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C a s c a d i a  S u b d u c t i o n  Z o n e 
Lying mostly offshore, the CSZ 
plate interface is a giant fault—
approximately 700 miles long 
(1,130 km). Here, the set of tec-
tonic plates to the west is sliding 
(subducting) beneath the North 
American Plate. The movement 
of these plates is neither constant 
nor smooth: the plates are stuck, 
and the stress will build up until 
the fault suddenly breaks. This last 
happened in January 1700. The 
result was an earthquake on the 
order of magnitude 9.0, followed 
within minutes by a large tsuna-
mi—much like the earthquake 
and tsunami that struck Japan 
on March 11, 2011. Stresses 
have now been building along 
the Cascadia subduction zone 
for more than 300 years, and the 
communities of Cascadia can be 
certain that another great quake 
will again shake the region.
The last Cascadia Subduction 
Zone event in 1700 offers no writ-
ten eye-witness accounts, although 
a few Native American and First 
Nations oral stories do relate some 
of the effects. Instead, scientists 
found the record of Cascadia’s past 
activity in the landscape itself, 
which was altered suddenly and in 
characteristic ways by these great 
earthquakes and the tsunamis 
they triggered. Once scientists 
discovered what to look for, they 
found evidence up and down 
the coastline, on land and on the 
seafloor, from British Columbia to 
California.
The world’s largest quakes occur 
along subduction zones. Dubbed 
great earthquakes, the magnitude 
of these events ranges from 8.0 to 
9.0+ (the largest on record was a 
magnitude 9.5 quake off the coast 
of Chile in 1960). Their charac-
teristics include prolonged ground 
shaking, large tsunamis, and 
numerous aftershocks. Because 
the magnitude scale is logarith-
mic, each increase of one unit 
signifies that the waves radiated by 
the earthquake are 10-times larger 
and 32-times more energetic. This 
means that a M9.0 quake releases 
1,995 times more energy than a 
M6.8. The Great Indonesia earth-
quake and tsunami of 2004 that 
killed 250,000 persons, and the 
East Japan earthquake and tsuna-
mi of 2011 that killed 16,000 are 
recent examples of great subduc-
tion zone earthquakes.
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Figure 1. Dynamics of the subduction zone: 
The subducting tectonic plate (solid gray) currently stuck against the over-riding North American Plate (brown) 
along the locked zone (marked in red). This has caused the edge of the North American plate to warp and 
elevate the land. When the pressure finally causes the fault to rupture, the North American Plate will flex and 
drop, producing a major earthquake and tsunami. The dotted lines in the left image mark the level of the land 
when not warped by accumulated strain; on the right, the dotted lines mark the elevation of the distorted 
plate just before the fault ruptured. Source: Cascadia Region Earthquake Working group (CREW), Cascadia 
Subduction Zone Earthquakes: A Magnitude 9.0 Earthquake Scenario (2013).
A n A t o m y  o f  A  C A s C A d i A  Z o n e  e A r t h q u A k e
The Cascadia Subduction Zone 
stretches from Cape Mendocino 
in northern California to Brooks 
Peninsula on Vancouver Island 
in British Columbia, a distance 
of about 700 miles (1,130 km). 
All along this zone, which begins 
beneath the seafloor to the west 
and extends inland towards the 
Cascade and Coastal mountains, 
the subducting plates are forced 
beneath the North American 
Plate. At a relatively shallow depth 
(less than about 20 miles/30 km 
down), the plates have become 
stuck. Below this locked zone, 
warmer temperatures make the 
plates more pliable, allowing them 
to move more readily past each 
other. This freer movement deeper 
down causes strain to accumulate 
along the locked zone. Once that 
strain is great enough to overcome 
the friction that keeps the plates 
locked, the fault will rupture: the 
edge of the North American Plate 
will lurch suddenly upwards and 
southwestwards as the subduct-
ing plates slip under and north-
eastwards. With this movement, 
the deformed western edge of 
the North American Plate will 
flex, causing the land along large 
sections of Cascadia’s coastline to 
drop as much as 6.6 feet (2 m) 
in elevation—an effect known as 
co-seismic subsidence. Figure 1 
illustrates a subduction zone rup-
ture and the ground deformations 
it creates.
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s h A k i n g  i n t e n s i t y
Although it is possible that the 
Cascadia subduction zone will 
rupture section by section in a 
series of large earthquakes (each 
measuring magnitude 8.0 to 8.5) 
over a period of years, the earth-
quake that many scientists and 
emergency planners anticipate is 
modeled on the zone’s last ma-
jor quake. The entire fault zone 
ruptures from end to end, causing 
one great earthquake measuring 
magnitude 9.0. The shaking that 
results from this abrupt shifting 
of the earth’s crust will be felt 
throughout the Pacific North-
west—and the ground is expected 
to go on shaking for four to six 
minutes.
Magnitude is a measure of an 
earthquake’s size: it tells how 
much energy is released when a 
fault ruptures. For the people and 
structures experiencing the earth-
quake, the intensity of the shaking 
is what really matters. In general, 
the intensity and destructiveness 
of the shaking will be greater the 
closer one is to the plate interface, 
with coastal areas experiencing the 
highest intensities and the level of 
shaking diminishing the farther 
inland one goes, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
How much the ground shakes, 
or the shaking intensity, depends 
on one’s location. Proximity is a 
major factor (the closer you are 
to the rupture, the more intense 
the shaking tends to be), but 
the shape and consistency of the 
ground makes a big difference. In 
the 2001 Nisqually earthquake, 
the greatest shaking intensities 
were not nearest the rupture, but 
in areas where the soft soils of 
river valleys and artificial fill am-
plified seismic waves, such as on 
Harbor Island in Seattle.
Shaking intensity is most often 
described using an intensity scale 
such as the Modified Mercalli 
Intensity (MMI) scale. Table 2 
provides general descriptions of 
the observed effects of ground 
shaking for each MMI level.
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Figure 2. Expected ground shaking intensities from a M9.0 Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake
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t h e  m o d i f i e d  m e r C A l l i  i n t e n s i t y  s C A l e
Table 2. The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale describes the observed effects of ground shaking at each 
























Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable conditions.
Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings.
Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of 
buildings. Many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing 
motor cars may rock slightly. Vibrations similar to the passing of a truck. 
Duration estimated.
Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some 
awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. 
Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Standing motor cars rocked 
noticeably.
Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. 
Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.
Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances 
of fallen plaster. Damage slight.
Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to 
moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly 
built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken.
Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in 
ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly 
built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, 
walls. Heavy furniture overturned.
Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame 
structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with 
partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.
Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame 
structures destroyed with foundations. Rails bent.
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t h e  t s u n A m i
Earthquakes cause damage by 
strong ground shaking and by 
the secondary effects of ground 
failures and tsunamis. When 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone 
ruptures, it will cause part of the 
seafloor to move abruptly upward. 
This displaces the column of water 
above the rupture. The result is a 
tsunami – a series of waves that 
travel outward in all directions 
from the place where the uplift 
occurred. Unlike wind-generated 
waves that travel along the surface, 
tsunami waves move through the 
entire body of water from seafloor 
to surface. Tsunami waves have 
extremely long wavelengths and 
contain a much greater volume 
of water than surface waves. This 
means that they look and act less 
like an ordinary wave and more 
like a vast, moving plateau of 
water.
A tsunami can travel across the 
deep ocean at nearly 500 miles 
(800 km) per hour. In deep 
water, the amplitude or height of 
the tsunami is low relative to its 
length, so the slope of the waves 
is very low, and they may pass 
unnoticed under ships. Upon 
entering shallower water, however, 
they slow down and gain in height 
as water piles up behind the 
wave front. Once it hits shore, a 
single tsunami wave can take as 
Figure 3. Following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, multiple tsunami 
waves inundated Natori city, over a period of hours. Source: Reuters.
much as an hour to finish flowing 
in. The height of the wave and 
how far inland it travels vary 
with location: In places along 
Cascadia’s coast, the tsunami 
may be as high as 30 to 40 feet 
(9 to 12 m). Much depends on 
the local topography—the lay 
of the land—both underwater 
and along the shore. In general, 
the inundation will be greater 
where the land is low or where 
the topography focuses the waves, 
such as at bays and river mouths. 
Other key factors are subsidence 
and tides: when the fault ruptures, 
the land in many coastal areas 
will drop in elevation, increasing 
the run-up of the subsequent 
tsunami; and if the quake occurs 
during high tide, the tsunami 
will travel farther inland than it 
would at low tide.
Because the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone is close to 
shore, the first wave will reach 
land soon after the earthquake—
within 20 to 30 minutes in 
some areas. Coastal residents 
can then expect to witness 
multiple waves over a period 
of hours. In addition, because 
parts of the coastline will have 
dropped (subsided) during the 
earthquake, some areas may 
remain flooded, or may continue 
to flood during high tide, even 
after the tsunami retreats.
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A f t e r s h o C k s
The Cascadia earthquake is likely 
to be followed by aftershocks, 
which will occur throughout the 
region and vary in size. After a 
main shock as large as magnitude 
9.0, a few aftershocks are likely to 
exceed magnitude 7.0. During the 
first month after the magnitude 
8.8 Maule earthquake in 2010, 
Chile experienced 19 aftershocks 
larger than magnitude 6.0 (the 
largest was magnitude 6.9). 
Japan’s magnitude 9.0 Tohoku 
earthquake in 2011 was preceded 
Figure 4. Chile’s M8.8 Maule 
earthquake in 2010 occurred 
on a subduction zone similar to 
Cascadia. On this map, green dots 
mark aftershocks that followed the 
Maule quake; red dots mark past 
earthquakes greater than M7.0 
(1900 to 2002). Earthquakes larger 
than M7.0 are rarer in Cascadia 
than in Chile, but a great quake 
on the Cascadia subduction zone 
is expected to trigger multiple 
aftershocks—including some far 
from the faulted area of the main 
shock. On the map, a solid white 
line encircles the section of the 
plate interface that broke in the 
Maule quake; white cross-hatching 
marks past ruptures. Photo: USGS
by a magnitude 7.5 foreshock and 
followed by multiple aftershocks, 
the largest of which measured 
magnitude 7.9. Some of these 
aftershocks occurred on the west 
side of Honshu, demonstrating 
that such quakes may be triggered 
some distance from the main 
shock.
Aftershocks that follow hard on 
the heels of the main shock can 
bring down already weakened 
buildings. While the size and 
frequency of aftershocks will 
diminish over time, a few may 
cause additional damage long 
after the initial quake. This 
occurred in New Zealand, where 
the magnitude 7.0 Darfield 
earthquake in September of 2010 
was followed by a magnitude 6.1 
aftershock over five months later, 
which caused far more damage to 
the city of Christchurch than the 
main shock.
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l A n d s l i d e s  A n d  l i q u e f A C t i o n
Local geologic conditions, includ-
ing soil type, can increase or de-
crease the intensity of the shaking 
and produce a range of secondary 
effects, including landslides, lique-
faction, and lateral spreads. 
Liquefaction is one of the most 
damaging effects of ground 
shaking. Certain soils, such as 
water-saturated silt and sand, 
can become dangerously unsta-
ble during an earthquake. The 
shaking increases water pressure, 
forcing the water to move in 
between the individual grains of 
soil; as the grains lose contact with 
each other, the soil begins to act 
like a liquid. Overlying layers of 
sediment can slump and spread 
laterally. Structures built on such 
soils may shift position or sink, 
Figure 5. Earthquakes can trigger 
preexisting landslides. This could 
happen immediately or days to 
weeks later. The 2001 Nisqually 
earthquake triggered a landslide 
three days after the earthquake. 
The same hillside slid after 
the 1949 South Puget Sound 
earthquake. Photo: Dave Sherrod, 
USGS. 
Figure 6. The 2011 Canterbury 
earthquake in New Zealand caused 
the loose sand and silt supporting 
the paved surfaces to liquefy and 
loose its ability to support this 
automobile. Liquefaction often 
results in uneven patterns of 
ground settlement. Photo: Martin 
Luff.     
Figure 7. Damage due to 
liquefaction and lateral spreading 
at the Port of Coronel in Chile after 
the M8.8 Maule earthquake. Port 
facilities are particularly vulnerable 
to damage from lateral spreading.  
Photo: Geotechnical Extreme 
Events Reconnaissance (GEER).
while buried pipes and tanks 
become buoyant and float to the 
surface. Liquefaction-prone soils 
are common in river valleys, along 
waterfronts, and in places covered 
with artificial fill. Unfortunately, 
these sites are often prime loca-
tions for important structures, 
including bridges, ports, airports, 
and industrial facilities. Many of 
the region’s most densely popu-
lated areas -- such as along the 
I-5 corridor between Eugene and 
Portland in Oregon and between 
Olympia and Everett in Washing-
ton -- are likely to experience the 
damaging effects of liquefaction. 
Areas on the steep slopes of 
mountain ranges in Washington 
and Oregon are susceptible to 
landslides and rock falls. Land-
slides can cause damage to critical 
infrastructure, residential and 
commercial structures. They can 
also isolate communities when 
landslides and rockfalls cross 
roadways or knock out power or 
communications lines. Shaking 
from earthquakes and aftershocks 
often trigger many landslides and 
rocksfalls. The risk of landslides 
and liquefaction can increase 
when heavy rainfall causes soil to 
become waterlogged and saturat-
ed.
Figure 5-7 show some of the 
damage of the impacts landslides 
and liquefaction can have on com-
munities. Figure 8 indicates areas 
susceptible to landslides triggered 
by seismic activity.
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Figure 8. Washington and Oregon areas susceptible to co-seismic land sliding
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f u t u r e  r i s k
The evidence for past subduction 
zone earthquakes of magnitude 
9.0 suggests that they recur, on 
average, every 500 years, but the 
actual intervals between events are 
far from predictable—such earth-
quakes have been separated by as 
many as 1,000 years and as few 
as 200. The estimates of the sizes 
of pre-1700 earthquakes are also 
uncertain. Cascadia has now been 
building up strain for over 300 
years, so the next great earthquake 
could happen at any time. 
Should the earthquake and 
tsunami happen tomorrow, it 
could affect millions of people’s 
lives, property, infrastructure, 
and environment. The number 
of deaths could exceed 10,000, 
and more than 30,000 people 
could be injured. The economic 
impacts could also be significant. 
For Washington and Oregon, 
the direct economic losses have 
been estimated at upward of $81 
billion. These social and economic 
impacts could distress the region 
for years to come.
While the timing cannot be 
forecast very precisely, great 
subduction zone earthquakes are 
inevitable—they are a fundamen-
tal consequence of plate tectonics. 
Whether this type of earthquake 
is considered alone or in combina-
tion with other earthquake sourc-
es, the odds that a large, damaging 
earthquake will occur in the near 
future in the Cascadia region are 
very high. The more steps our 
communities take now to prepare, 
the more resilient we will be.
By detecting the smaller seismic waves that precede the earthquake’s 
destructive waves, an early warning system might provide a few sec-
onds to a few minutes of warning to cities (such as Portland, Seattle, 
and Vancouver) that are some distance from the Cascadia subduction 
zone. This would give people time to drop, cover, and hold, and it 
could be enough time to shut off gas mains, open fire station doors, 
slow freeway traffic, and clear cars away from potentially dangerous 
structures (such as bridges and viaducts). The University of Washing-
ton, Caltech, and the University of California, Berkeley, with support 
from the U.S. Geological Survey and the Gordon and Betty Moore 
Foundation, have begun development of an earthquake early warn-
ing system. Japan has already implemented such a system and used 
it to provide some warning of the Tohoku earthquake on March 11, 
2011. While Japan’s experience suggests that early warning systems 
are promising, much still needs to be done to test the usefulness and 
appropriateness of such a system for the western coast of the United 
States.
British Columbia is likewise in the process of developing an earth-
quake early warning system through the cooperation of the Ministry 
of Transportation, Natural Resources Canada, the University of British 
Columbia, and Ocean Networks Canada. The project will use offshore 
sensors in the northern Cascadia Subduction Zone and land-based 
instruments throughout the province to deliver earthquake warnings.
C o n t i n u i n g  r e s e A r C h :
e A r t h q u A k e  e A r l y  W A r n i n g  s y s t e m s
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t h e  m 9  P r o j e C t
The ground motions and tsunami caused by a magnitude 9 earthquake will depend on many factors. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to predict the resulting landslides, liquefaction, and building response. At the University of 
Washington, a team of researchers involved in the NSF-funded “M9 Project,” are currently working to probabi-
listically forecast the shaking and earthquake-related effects that cities across the Cascadia region will experi-
ence in the wake of a magnitude 9 event.
Several factors will affect the pattern of shaking caused by a magnitude 9 earthquake. The distribution of asper-
ities (i.e., pockets of concentrated strain energy on the fault), the direction that the rupture propagates, and the 
geology of the Puget Sound basins all influence where the shaking will be strongest. In order to better quantify 
the potential shaking across the Pacific Northwest, the M9 Project is generating a suite of state-of-the-art 3-D 
simulations of fault rupture and their resulting ground motions that take into account these variabilities. In addi-
tion to stronger shaking, a large magnitude 9 earthquake will also generate more long-period energy and have 
a longer duration of shaking than smaller earthquakes. The effects of this long-period energy and longer dura-
tion of shaking on liquefaction, seismically-induced landslides, and building response is still poorly understood 
and a target for ongoing M9 Project research.
Similarly, destructive tsunami impacts on the coastal built environment, and the number of fatalities and injuries 
inflicted, will be strongly dependent on the details of the earthquake ground motion. In particular, tsunamis are 
generated from the vertical seafloor deformation that occurs during an earthquake, so the severity of tsunami 
impacts on a given coastal community are critically dependent on its location relative to the magnitude and 
precisely how the fault slips over the thousands of square kilometers that rupture during the earthquake. In 
general, a patch of fault surface that slips will spawn a tsunami that will strike the community sooner and with 
more destructive waves than a patch with relatively little slippage. Therefore, during the same M9 event, individ-
ual Washington and Oregon coastal communities could experience different tsunami wave heights up to 30+ 
feet and arrival times from about 10 to 30 minutes. But adequately detailed predictions of the variability in fault 
slip for tsunami hazard assessments are not known.  For this reason, the M9 project is developing and testing 
probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment methods, in which the best available science is used to weigh the prob-
ability of a large number of distributions that are deemed credible, and the associated tsunami simulations are 
combined to produce probabilistic tsunami hazard products, including forces on structures. In addition, the M9 
project conducts research into the physics of tsunami generation by landslides and the probabilistic characteri-
zation of this process.
In the long-term, M9 Project researchers aim to integrate probabilistic hazard scenarios for earthquake shaking, 
tsunami generation, liquefaction, seismically induced landslides, and building response into the preparation and 
response plans for earthquake-related hazards in the Pacific Northwest. Further information on The M9 Project 
can be found at http://m9.ess.washington.edu/public/M9_Home.html.
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t s u n a m i  i m p a c t s
The tsunami inundation zone extends 450 miles 
along the coast of Washington and Oregon. The 
majority of the coastline is sparsely populated. 
Nonetheless, the tsunami wave will likely cause 
devastating damage and loss of life. Anyone in the 
tsunami zone when the first wave hits will likely be 
quickly killed or seriously injured; buildings, roads, 
bridges, and utility infrastructure in the tsunami 
inundation zone will likely be severely damaged or 
completely destroyed, as illustrated in Figure 9.
As tsunami waves travel across the deep ocean, 
tsunami monitoring equipment may detect the 
wave. However, warning messages may not reach 
many coastal communities before the first waves 
make landfall. With only tens of minutes before the 
tsunami reaches the coastline in some areas, the only 
warning these communities receive may come from 
the earthquake itself. 
Some survivors may try to evacuate by car but will 
likely be stopped by impassable roads or bridges. 
With limited passable driving routes away from the 
coast, the movement of people fleeing the coastline 
will likely result in gridlock. Thus, most survivors 
will be forced to walk or run to higher ground. 
However, downed power lines, damaged streets and 
buildings, and other damage may slow evacuation. 
Moreover, people who suffer injuries from the earth-
quake may be unable to move fast enough to reach 
safety.
Over 86,000 residents live in the tsunami inun-
dation zone that is likely to result from an M9.0 
Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake. Assuming 
these 86,000 residents are present at the time of the 
initial earthquake and evacuate the inundation zone 
at a slow walk, over 20,000 residents will likely be 
unable to make it to high ground. When the wave 
hits, as many as 15,000 of these residents could 
potentially be swept out to sea or crushed in debris 
entrenched in the tsunami water. The remaining 
survivors may suffer from crushing, puncture, abra-
sion, exposure, and other injuries. During certain 
times, thousands of additional tourists, workers, 
and commuters may also be in the inundation zone 
and at risk; at these times, loss of life may be much 
higher.
Even after the first wave recedes, the danger will not 
be over. Tsunami waves will continue to surge in 
and out of inundation zones for up to 24 hours after 
the earthquake. In the coming days, there will likely 
be numerous large aftershocks, some of which may 
have the potential to generate additional tsunami 
waves. 
Survivors in many coastal communities may be 
stranded for weeks due to damaged ground trans-
portation networks. Air and sea transportation 
may be the only viable way to access many coastal 
communities.
Figure 9. The tsunami resulting from the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake destroyed the low-lying areas of tsuchi, 
Japan. Photo: Dylan McCord, U.S. Navy. 
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The tsunami inundation zone in Washington is 
located on the coast of the Pacific Ocean and along 
the coasts of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Some inun-
dation is also expected on the coasts of counties in 
the upper Puget Sound, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
Over 50,000 Washingtonians reside in the tsunami 
inundation zone. After the initial ground shaking, 
survivors may have 30 to 60 minutes before the 
first wave makes landfall. At a slow walk, as many 
as 14,000 of the 50,000 residents may be unable to 
reach higher ground before the first wave hits. Most 
of the people who are still in the tsunami zone when 
the first wave arrives may be swept out to sea or 
crushed by debris entrenched in the tsunami water. 
During certain times, as many as 25,000 workers, 
17,000 tourists, and thousands of commuters may 
also be in the inundation zone, increasing the po-
tential for loss of life substantially. 
As illustrated in Figures 10 and 11, many towns in 
Pacific and Grays Harbor Counties are located in 
the tsunami zone. The tsunami will likely devastate 
the cities of Aberdeen, Ocean Shores, Westport, 
Long Beach, Hoquiam, Cosmopolis, and Shoalwa-
ter Bay Indian Reservation. 
The city of Aberdeen has a high number of residents 
and infrastructure in the tsunami zone. However, 
due to its close proximity to higher ground, most 
people will likely make it to safety before the wave 
hits. While the tsunami will destroy a significant 
number of buildings and facilities in Aberdeen, 
some facilities outside of the inundation zone will 
likely be available to set up triage and temporary 
shelters. 
Ocean Shores, Long Beach, Westport, Hoquiam, 
and Shoalwater Bay Indian Reservation are also 
located in the tsunami zone. However, nearly all of 
these towns’ infrastructure and residential homes 
may be completely inundated by the tsunami. With 
everything in these towns potentially destroyed, the 
remaining survivors may need to be evacuated from 
these tsunami-inundated areas.
w a s h i n g t o n :  T s u n a m i  I m p a c t s
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Figure 10. Tsunami inundation zone along the coast of Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay, Washington
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Figure 11. Tsunami inundation zone along the Pacific Coast of Washington
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Figure 12. Tsunami inundation zone along the coast of the Puget Sound area of Washington
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Over 30,000 Oregonians live in the tsunami in-
undation zone that is likely to result from a M9.0 
Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake. After the 
initial ground shaking, survivors may only have 
tens of minutes before the first wave makes landfall. 
Assuming the 30,000 residents are present at the 
time of the initial earthquake and begin evacuating 
the tsunami zone at a slow walk, as many as 6,000 
residents may be unable reach higher ground before 
the first wave hits. Most people who are still in the 
inundation zone may be swept out to sea or crushed 
by debris entrenched in the tsunami water. During 
certain times, as many as 50,000 tourists, 15,000 
workers and thousands of commuters may also be in 
this inundation zone, potentially increasing the loss 
of life substantially.
As illustrated in Figures 13 and 14, many coastal 
towns and cities are located in the tsunami inunda-
tion zone. Nearly all of the city of Seaside’s infra-
structure and buildings will likely be completely 
inundated by the tsunami. First responders will 
likely have no working facilities to set up triage or 
temporary shelter. The remaining survivors will 
likely need to be evacuated. 
o r e g o n :  T s u n a m i  I m p a c t s
28
Figure 13. Tsunami inundation zone along the northern Oregon coast
29
Figure 14. Tsunami inundation zone along the southern Oregon coast
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p o p u l at i o n  i m p a c t s
The Cascadia earthquake could be one of the most 
devastating disasters, not only in Washington and 
Oregon, but in the history of the United States. As 
the day of the earthquake arrives, no one suspects 
that they are about to witness an event that will 
change their lives forever.
If the earthquake occurs during the day, few people 
will even notice when the shaking begins. For many 
people it may feel as if a large semi-truck is passing 
by; people in cars or near busy roads may not notice 
the initial tremors. As the shaking becomes more 
prominent, its jitteriness may catch the attention 
of people not in a car. However, many people may 
forget their elementary training of drop, cover, and 
hold, especially people caught outdoors. Instead, 
some people may attempt to run to safety, but 
only make it a few steps before falling. Others may 
simply stand in place, trying to retain balance and 
keep from being thrown to the ground. A minute 
into the earthquake, intense shaking may toss peo-
ple about. Bookshelves, desks, and other pieces of 
heavy furniture may begin to move back and forth, 
causing anything that is not anchored to fall. People 
in office buildings may notice nearby skyscrapers 
swaying from side to side. Only a small percentage 
of people may have gotten under tables, chairs, or 
anything else that they think will protect them from 
falling ceiling tiles, utility equipment or furniture. 
Two minutes into the earthquake, people that were 
caught outside may notice the ground moving like 
an ocean wave and everyone inside may feel as if 
they were on a ship rolling out at sea.
Coastal areas will likely experience the most se-
vere and intense shaking, with shaking intensities 
of Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale levels 
of VII (Severe) extending as far inland as 10 to 
60 miles, depending on the location. The shaking 
may be strong enough to knock over columns and 
monuments, overturn heavy furniture, knock down 
walls, and collapse or break chimneys, sending large 
chunks of brick on to roofs. Even well-built struc-
tures may partially collapse after several minutes of 
this level of intense shaking.
The shaking decreases in intensity going eastward 
from the coast. The Interstate 5 corridor may experi-
ence shaking intensities of MMI VII (Very Strong), 
with considerable damage incurred in poorly-built 
or designed structures and in areas with poorer soils. 
People living in the eastern half of Oregon and 
Washington may experience little shaking, simply 
feeling as if the ground is vibrating. Parked cars may 
rock and hanging objects may sway slightly. Win-
dows, dishes, and doors may rattle, and buildings 
with wooden walls and frames may creak during the 
event. 
As the shaking subsides, people may display an array 
of emotions and reactions. Widespread power out-
ages may make daytime visibility inside large build-
ings difficult. If the event strikes at night, fallen 
objects littering the floor may cause people to trip 
and injure themselves as they try to escape in the 
dark. In some homes and buildings, heavy pieces 
of furniture, such as entertainment centers or filing 
cabinets, may tip over, blocking exits or trapping 
people under them.  
After the shaking, people may begin milling around, 
uncertain how to respond to the event. Some may 
gather up belongings and search around in the fallen 
debris, trying to make sense of what has happened. 
Many people with access to a phone may try to call 
or text their loved ones to figure out what has hap-
pened and verify their safety. A sense of dread may 
overcome individuals that are unable to get in touch 
with their family and friends.
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Outside, commuters may get out of their cars and 
try to figure out what just took place. As they realize 
that traffic is not moving, and that they may be 
stuck there for hours, drivers may abandon their 
cars on roads and bridges, causing backups along 
transportation routes.
On the coast, the threat of a tsunami has taught 
many residents to seek out information about the 
tsunami warning protocols for their area. Longtime 
local residents may be more efficient in their evacu-
ation process, having prior knowledge of the threat 
of a tsunami following an earthquake. Visitors and 
tourists to the region’s beautiful coastal towns may 
largely be unsure of what to do, if they are even 
p o p u l at i o n  i m p a c t S  ( c o n t. ) 
aware of the tsunami threat. They may congregate in 
hotel lobbies and in the streets near vacation houses, 
seeking direction. In areas where high ground is dis-
tant, people may become stuck in traffic jams that 
slow or even halt evacuation by vehicle. In some 
areas, people may attempt to evacuate vertically, 
climbing to upper stories of multi-story buildings. 
As the tsunami reaches land, those on the ground in 
the inundation zone may try to outrun the tsunami; 
very few of them may make it. As the wave knocks 
them off their feet they may cling to the roofs of 
buildings or floating debris, but these actions will 
save very few. Hypothermia or exhaustion may 
claim many of them. 
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Following the earthquake and tsunami, thousands 
of injured survivors may be in need of medical care. 
They may seek medical treatment for cuts, bruises, 
and broken bones. Others may suffer from trauma 
injuries that require acute medical care. The earth-
quake may injure over 20,000 people across the re-
gion. Minutes later, the tsunami may injure several 
thousand more in the coastal region. More injuries 
may result from aftershocks, fires, HAZMAT releas-
es, and contaminated water supplies.
In the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, 
thousands of injured survivors may be scattered 
across hundreds of miles of tsunami inundated 
coastland. Medical facilities in the region may 
experience a surge of as many as 30,000 injured 
survivors seeking medical treatment. Some injured 
survivors may arrive at the hospital only to find out 
that it has been damaged beyond use. Others may 
never make it to the hospital because of impassable 
roads. Thousands of critically injured people may 
need to be evacuated by air or sea if they are to be 
saved.
The number of injured will be affected by the time 
of the earthquake. Injuries will likely be highest if 
the shaking occurs during the day - a time when 
more people are outside or at work and exposed to 
falling debris, or commuting and exposed to traffic 
accidents and damaged roadways. If the event were 
to occur at night, minor and moderate injuries of 
severity level 1 or 2 may be a half or less than injury 
estimates during a daytime event. Table 3 describes 
the injuires expected for each injury severity level. 
I n j u r i e s






Injuries requiring basic 
medical aid that could 
be administered by 
paraprofessionals. 
These types of injuries 
would require bandag-
es or observation, such 
as sprains, cuts, and 
minor burns.
Non-life threathen-
ing Injuries requiring 
greater medical care 
and technology, such as 
x-rays or surgery. These 
types of injuries could 
include large burns, 
broken bones, and/or 
loss of consciousness.
Injuries that pose an 
immediate life threat-
ening condition if not 
treated adequately and 
expeditiously, such as 
uncontrolled bleeding, 
punctured organs, spi-
nal column injuries, or 
crush syndrome.
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The number of severity level 3 injuries – injuries 
that are immediately life-threatening if not treated 
– are most affected by earthquake timing. Severity 
level 3 injuries will be highest during the day. If the 
event were to occur during the night, these injuries 
may be only a quarter or less of the daytime esti-
mates. 
If the earthquake were to occur during commuting 
hours, these severe injury numbers may rise further. 
During these commuting hours, more people may 
be leaving or entering buildings, on the streets of 
high-density downtown business areas, or in retail 
stores full of unsecured products on high shelves. 
These individuals may be exposed to falling debris 
and shattering glass. The many commuters on the 
road may be more exposed to vehicular injuries, ac-
cidents, and damaged roadways. If an event were to 
happen during these commuting hours, the number 
of severe injuries could be 20 fold greater, or more, 
than the number likely to result from a nighttime 
event.
I n j u r i e s  ( C o n t. )
Figure 16. Rescue workers pull an injured woman from 
a collapsed building following the 2011 Christchurch, 
New Zealand earthquake. Photo: Reuters.
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Not all will survive the event. Across the coastal and 
I-5 corridor regions, the earthquake shaking may 
claim the lives of over 1,100 residents and visitors. 
The tsunami that closely follows may claim as many 
as 13,500 lives on the coast. The scale of fatalities 
across the coast may overwhelm the resources of 
local governments. Hospitals and morgues on the 
coast may also need to manage numerous human 
remains. Temporary morgues may have to contend 
with power outages and fuel shortages.
With emergency responders unable to reach many 
areas, survivors may attempt to manage the remains 
of community members themselves. The disruptions 
in communications systems may limit the reach 
of public messaging and training regarding public 
health and the safe disposal of deceased humans, 
farm animals, and pets.
The number of fatalities will also be highly depen-
dent on the time of the event. Fatalities, like inju-
ries, may be lowest during a night time event. They 
are likely to increase threefold during a daytime 
event in rural areas and fivefold or more in urban 
areas, regardless of whether the event occurs during 
the workday or during a commuting hours.
f ata l i t i e s
Figure 16. Morgue overcrowding following the 2011 
Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, led workers to 
create makeshift morgues like this one in gymnasiums 
and other available facilities. Photo: Damir Sagolj, 
Reuters.
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With the adoption of increasingly robust building 
codes with seismic design provisions over the last 
several decades, much of the newer building stock 
in Washington has been designed for life safety even 
in strong shaking. As shown in Table 4, the highest 
number of earthquake-related injuries and deaths 
are likely in the urban areas of Seattle, which has 
many older structures that were not built to these 
codes and where people are more exposed to col-
lapsing buildings, falling glass, and other objects 
that may cause injury or death. 
The highest number of tsunami-related injuries and 
deaths will likely be in Grays Harbor County, with 
as many as 5,000 casualties in Ocean Shores alone. 
The city of Long Beach in Pacific County may also 
have a high number of tsunami casualties. It is likely 
that most residents in these communities will not 
reach high ground before the tsunami wave hits. 
Nearly all of the infrastructure and residential 
housing in Ocean Shores, Long Beach, Westport, 
Hoquiam, and Shoalwater Bay Indian Reservation 
will likely be destroyed by the tsunami. After the 
water recedes, there may be no remaining build-
ings to set up triage or temporary shelters. The few 
remaining survivors in these towns will likely need 
to be evacuated. 
w a s h i n g t o n :  I n j u r i e s  a n d  F ata l i t i e s
Table 4. Estimated injuries and deaths in Washington resulting from the CSZ
earthquake and tsunami 












Source: FEMA CSZ Response Plan (2013) and Wood - see Methodology section for more detail
*Tsunami deaths and injuries in the I-5 corridor represent exposed populations in the upper Puget Sound region, such as 
coastal communities in San Juan, Island, Skagit and Whatcom counties. However, studies are conflicting as to the fatalities 
and injuries in these inundation zones. These numbers are not included in state totals.
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With the adoption of increasingly robust building 
codes with seismic design provisions over the last 
several decades, much of the newer building stock 
in Oregon has been designed for life safety even in 
strong shaking. As shown in Table 5, the highest 
number of earthquake-related injuries and deaths 
are likely in the Portland metropolitan area, which 
has many older structures that were not built to 
withstand intense shaking and where people are 
more exposed to collapsing buildings, falling glass, 
and other objects that may cause injury or death.
The highest number of tsunami-related injuries and 
deaths are likely in Clatsop County, with over 4,000 
casualties in the city of Seaside alone. 
o r e g o n :  I n j u r i e s  a n d  F ata l i t i e s
Table 5. Estimated injuries and deaths in Oregon resulting from the CSZ
earthquake and tsunami 












Source: FEMA CSZ Response Plan (2013) and Wood - see Methodology section for more detail
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t r a n s p o r tat i o n  s y s t e m s
The severe shaking and tsunami inundation may 
cause significant damage to the region’s ground, 
air, and marine transportation systems. The dam-
age may be widespread – affecting approximately 
16,000 miles of highway, 7,000 highway bridges, 
6,000 miles of rail, 100 rail bridges, 100 airports, 
and 700 port facilities. Most of the Pacific North-
west’s transportation infrastructure was constructed 
prior to modern seismic design standards. Many 
bridges, tunnels, and ports have yet to be seismically 
retrofitted to withstand the shaking. Additionally, 
many transportation systems are built across lique-
fiable soils along old landslides that may be set in 
motion by the earthquake. 
The road and highway network is one of the most 
critical infrastructure systems. If roads are damaged 
and impassable, inspecting and repairing other 
infrastructure systems becomes difficult or even im-
possible. The challenge of restoring transportation 
networks after a Cascadia event may be compound-
ed by the damages to other interconnected systems, 
such as fuel, power and communication systems.
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R o a d s
During the initial response period, widespread road 
damage may impair rescue operations, access to crit-
ical buildings, and the restoration of utilities. In the 
impacted area of Washington and Oregon, roughly 
one-third of highways may suffer medium to high 
damage, with damages ranging from localized, mod-
erate cracking to the complete failure of pavement 
and subsurface soils supporting the roads. 
Table 6 describes road damage for each damage 
state. This damage is due to ground failure as a re-
sult of lateral or vertical displacement, liquefaction, 
or landslides. The photos in Figures 19-24 illustrate 
these types of ground failures and corresponding 
damage states.
Close to half of Interstate 5, running from the 
southern Oregon border to the U.S.-Canadian 
border, may suffer medium to high damage and 
be unusable for long distance travel until road and 
bridge repairs are made. These repair procedures 
may be as simple as sealing large cracks or patching 
up bumps in the pavement, or extensive enough to 
require the complete removal and replacement of 
existing pavement and subsurface materials. 
Road damage may be particularly severe in coastal 
areas where the shaking is most intense. Almost 
the entire stretch of U.S. Highway 101, from the 
southern Oregon border to the northern tip of the 
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Figure 17. The 2011 Tohoku tsunami caused high damage 
to roadways, shifting parts of the road up or down by more 
than a foot. Photo: Japan Red Cross Society, published in 
the New York Times March 24, 2011. 
Figure 18. The 2010 M7.1 Canterbury, New Zealand 
earthquake caused low to medium damage to roadways, 
with two to five inches of permanent ground displacement. 
Photo: Martin Luff. 
R o a d s  ( C o n t. )
Olympic Peninsula, may suffer high damage, with 
the roadway shifting up or down a foot or more in 
many areas. Low-lying segments of U.S. 101 that 
survive the shaking will likely be damaged by the 
rushing waters of the tsunami or landslides. Figure 
17 illustrates roadways destroyed by a tsunami. 
Most of the roads connecting coastal communities 
to the I-5 corridor may also suffer high damage due 
to extensive ground settlement. With few drivable 
routes from the coast to the I-5 corridor, coastal 
communities along U.S. 101 may be unable to 
self-evacuate. Emergency responders may also find 
it nearly impossible to deliver emergency supplies 
of food, water, fuel, and materials by ground until 
sufficient road repairs are made, which could take 
several months. However, the coast may still be 
accessible by sea or air. Figures 20-21 shows the type 
of high damage to expect on segments of coastal 
highway. 
In urban areas, damage to roadways may cause 
heavy traffic congestion as commuters attempt to 
drive from work to home or as individuals seek 
to drive toward loved ones. While some degree of 
movement may be possible via alternate routes, mo-
torists may need to expect longer travel times and 
heavy congestion. 
Roads connecting major urban areas in the I-5 
corridor with infrastructure in eastern Oregon and 
eastern Washington, may suffer little structural 
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Figure 21. The 2007 Niigata earthquake in Japan triggered 
landslides that took out portions of roads. Some critical 
roadways in Oregon and Washington were built atop 
preexisting landslides, which could be triggered again 
during the earthquake. Source, CREW.
Figure 19. A M7.0 earthquake in California caused medium 
damage to roadways, with three to twelve inches of vertical 
displacement dissecting the road. This type of damage can 
be patched with an asphalt concrete overlay. Photo: Karl V. 
Steinbrugge, HITRAC.
Figure 20. The 2011 M6.3 Christchurch, New Zealand 
earthquake caused high damage to roadways as a result of 
ground failure due to liquefaction. This type of damage may 
require the removal and replacement of existing pavement. 
Photo: David Hallett, HITRAC.
R o a d s  ( C o n t. )
damage to the roads themselves. However, there are 
only a handful of eastbound routes that run through 
the steep, mountainous terrain of the Cascades and 
many of these routes cross pre-existing landslides. 
The earthquake could trigger landslides that block 
or endanger these mountain passes. With only two 
major interstate highways, a handful of U.S. and 
state routes, and two rail lines crossing the Cascades, 
even a few landslide events or damaged bridges on 
these routes may cripple the movement of supplies 
from the eastern side of Washington and Oregon 
into the I-5 corridor and coastal regions.
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Over a quarter of Washington’s road infrastructure 
may suffer medium to high damage, with damages 
ranging from large cracks and ground settlement to 
complete failure of pavement structure and sub-
surface materials. The high damage road segments 
may be completely unusable until major repairs are 
made.
Washington’s portion of the I-5 interstate stretches 
some 250 miles from the Canadian border to the 
southern border with Oregon. Roughly two-thirds 
may suffer medium or greater damage, with large 
cracks and major settlement across many segments 
of roadway. Damage may be particularly severe in 
the Seattle-Tacoma region, as shown in Figure 22. 
Roadway damage may be extensive throughout 
the coast and coastal mountain chain. As shown 
in Table 7, 75 percent of the roadways may suffer 
high damage, including over 12 inches of ground 
displacement resulting in the failure of pavement 
and subsurface materials. Nearly the full extent of 
U.S. 101 may suffer high structural damage, with 
landslide debris blocking segments of road near 
Chinook, Hoquiam, Port Angeles, and Shelton. 
Most of the primary and secondary roads between 
the coast and the I-5 corridor may be unusable for 
long-distance travel due to high structural damage 
caused by the initial earthquake. Alternative routes 
along tertiary roads may exist. However, landslide 
debris may render these roads inaccessible or unus-
able.
When the tsunami waves make landfall, parts of 
as many as eight major coastal highways will likely 
be destroyed by the force of the waves.  Coastal 
communities will likely be completely isolated for a 
couple of weeks. Restoration of ground transporta-
tion infrastructure connecting coastal communities 
to the interior of the states may take several months. 
w a s h i n g t o n :  R o a d s
Table 7. Distribution of damage states for highways in Washington state,
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Figure 22. Washington state road and tunnel damage caused by the initial earthquake
43
In Oregon, the I-5 highway stretches over 300 miles 
from the Washington border to the southern border 
with California. Roughly half of the interstate may 
suffer high structural damage from the initial earth-
quake, with large cracks and major settlement across 
many segments of roadway. Mountainous terrain 
in the southern part of Oregon and ongoing slope 
instability in areas around Portland may cause high 
damage to much of I-5 from Eugene to Portland. 
Large cracks, loose soil, and landslide debris may 
occur along this stretch of highway.
Roadway damage may be extensive throughout the 
coastal region, as shown in Figure 23. As shown in 
Table 8, ninety-one percent of the roadways in the 
coastal corridor may suffer high damage, including 
over 12 inches of ground displacement resulting 
in the failure of pavement and subsurface materi-
als. Nearly the full extent of U.S. Highway 101 in 
Oregon may be completely destroyed by the initial 
earthquake.  
Most of the primary and secondary roads connect-
ing coastal roads to the I-5 corridor may also suffer 
high damage and be unusable for long-distance trav-
el. Along U.S. 20 from Corvallis to Newport, dam-
age may be especially heavy, with up to three feet of 
settlement across segments of roadway. Oregon state 
highways 38, 126, 34, 20, 18, 22, and U.S. 26 may 
suffer high damage along their full extent. 
Oregon highways 4, 6, 8, 105, 109, and 112, as well 
as U.S. 12 may have large cracks and major settle-
ment across many segments of roadway. Loose soil 
and landslide debris may block access to segments 
along Oregon 42, U.S. 199 and U.S. 30. Many of 
these roadways may be closed for several weeks to 
several months. Travel up and down the coast and 
into the valley will be difficult. Alternative routes 
along tertiary roads may exist. However, landslide 
debris may render these roads inaccessible or unus-
able. 
When the tsunami waves make landfall, as many as 
twenty-five major coastal highways may be partially 
or fully destroyed by the force of the waves.
O r e g o n :  R o a d s
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Figure 23. Oregon road and tunnel damage caused by the initial earthquake
45
R o a d  B r i d g e s
As seismic waves move across the region, over 9,000 
bridges that tie our transportation network together 
will be put to the test. Seismic waves are amplified 
when they move across the deep, soft soils that 
support many of our bridges. Amplified waves may 
send destructive, resonate vibrations across long 
bridges, causing them to twist, swing, and pull away 
from their abutments. As the shaking subsides, two-
thirds of the region’s road bridges may be damaged 
to some degree. Table 9 describes bridge damage for 
each damage state. Figures 24-27 provide examples 
of these damage states from past earthquakes and 
tsunamis. This damage is due to ground failure as 
a result of lateral or vertical displacement, liquefac-
tion, or landslides.
The majority of these damaged bridges may with-
stand the shaking well, experiencing minor cracking 
of decks and abutments, and some sloughing-off of 
concrete protective layers on bridge piers. These cos-
metic damages may not interrupt traffic, and may 
require only minor repairs. 
Some 2,000 bridges may suffer moderate levels 
of damage and may not be able to support even 
reduced vehicular traffic until temporary supports 







Minor cracking or 
sloughing off of the 
outer layer of concrete 
columns or walls sup-
porting bridges or to 
bridge decks. These 
damages require only 
minor, cosmetic repairs, 
but the bridges can sup-
port traffic even before 
these repairs are made.
Moderate damage 
requiring repairs before 
use, but not requiring 
demolition of bridg-
es. These moderate 
damages may include 
extensive cracking of 
support columns, up 
to two inches of move-
ment in bridge columns 
alignment, or extensive 
damage to the connec-
tions between a bridge 
and its support columns 
or walls. Bridges may 
not support heavy loads 
and will likely require en-
gineering assessments 
before deemed safe for 
traffic.
Bridge collapse or 
damages so severe as to 
require demolition and 
complete replacement 
of the entire bridge. This 
damage may include 
collapse of bridge deck 
or any column supporting 
the bridge, or tilting of 
the bridge due to foun-
dation failure. Bridges 
likely impassable to 
traffic.
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Figure 25. The 1994 M6.7 Northridge Earthquake 
caused low damage to a California highway bridge, 
shifting sections of the bridge and breaking a guard 
rail. Bridges with low damage should be operational 
and require only minor repair later. Photo: Mark 
Aschheim.
Figure 24. The 1989 M6.9 Loma Priesta earthquake 
in California caused medium damage to the support 
column of a bridge. The shaking caused the concrete 
to break up and shift the bridge column alignment.   
Photo: H.G. Wilshire, USGS. 
R o a d  B r i d g e s  ( C o n t. )
are put in place. Later, they may need extensive 
repair to be fully functional again. However, nearly 
20 percent of the bridges in the region – over 1,000 
bridges – may either completely collapse or be dam-
aged enough as to require the replacement of the 
entire bridge. Aftershocks may continue to impact 
transportation systems in the response and recovery 
phases, worsening damage to moderately and heavi-
ly damaged bridges.
Bridges along the coastal highways from Southern 
Oregon to the northern tip of the Olympic Peninsu-
la may suffer the highest level of damage, especially 
bridges carrying U.S. 101. Several bridges that 
survived the earthquake may be washed away by the 
tsunami. Additionally, debris from bridge collapse 
and tsunami inundation will block access to critical 
transportation infrastructure. 
With direct shaking damage to bridges and land 
sliding onto highways or bridges, traditional ground 
access from the I-5 corridor west to the coast may 
be completely cut off. Due to the rugged terrain 
upon which these highways were built, detouring 
traffic around bridge collapses may not be possible 
in all locations. 
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Figure 27. Following the 1994 M6.7 Northridge 
Earthquake in California, several freeway bridges such 
as this post-tensioned north to south connector ramp, 
completely collapsed. Heavily damaged and collapse 
of bridges that have not been seismically retrofitted 
may severely disrupt transportation and take years to 
demolish and rebuild. Photo: Guillermo Santana.
Figure 26. Tsunami waves following the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake in Japan slammed into a pier supporting 
a rail bridge. The force of the tsunami waves washed 
away the bridge spans and heavily damaged the pier. 
Photo: Shideh Dashti.
Access to the east-west corridor will be critical for 
people trying to evacuate the tsunami. Due to 
transportation impacts, many survivors in coastal 
communities may be unable to self-evacuate out of 
the most heavily impacted areas. In the immediate 
aftermath, coastal survivors may remain scattered 
across hundreds of miles of coastline in isolated 
tsunami-inundated communities. With heavily 
damaged bridges and degraded roadways, delivering 
emergency supplies may be impossible using tradi-
tional ground transportation.
R o a d  B r i d g e s  ( C o n t. )
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Many of the bridges in Washington may withstand 
the shaking well and may not interrupt transpor-
tation. However, as many as 30 percent of bridges 
may suffer moderate levels of damage and may not 
be able to support even reduced vehicular traffic un-
til temporary supports are put in place. Roughly 20 
percent of bridges – over 700 - may either complete-
ly collapse or be in imminent danger of collapse. 
Over a dozen bridges holding I-5 may suffer irrepa-
rable damage from the earthquake, and several may 
collapse. Many of the recently seismically retrofitted 
I-5 overpasses from south of Everett to Joint Base 
Lewis-McChord may only suffer minor damage. 
However, the on/off ramps to those overpasses may 
have damage. Figures 28 and 29 show the locations 
of damaged bridges in Washington State.
As shown in Table 10, half of the bridges in coastal 
corridor may sustain high damage. This damage 
may be extensive enough to require the complete 
replacement of the entire bridge. Within minutes 
of the earthquake, the resulting tsunami may send 
waves of water and debris that inundate several 
more coastal bridges.
W a s h i n g t o n :  R o a d  B r i d g e s
Most of western Washington’s bridges are 
located in high to moderate seismic zones 
and were designed prior to modern stan-
dards. To address this, the Washington State 
Department of Transportation (WSDOT) has 
invested more than $166 million since the 
early 1990s to retrofit existing bridges.
To date, 284 bridges in the program have 
been retrofitted, 34 are currently being 
retrofitted and 595 still require work. Each 
bridge is evaluated based on capacity and 
needs using nationally adopted guidelines. 
From July 2013 to July 2017, WSDOT will 
spend $26 million to shore up bridges. To 
complete all of the bridges in the program 
will require approximately $1.4 billion.
WSDOT, federal, and local officials have pri-
oritized some of the retrofitting to create a 
resilient bridge “life line” through the Puget 
Sound. The goal is to create a north-south 
route between Joint Base Lewis-McChord 
south of Tacoma and Paine Field in Everett 
that can be used to transport emergency 
supplies after a major earthquake.
B r i d g e  r e t r o f i t t i n g  i n
W A s h i n g t o n  s t A t e
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W a s h i n g t o n :  R o a d  B r i d g e s  ( c o n t. )
Table 10. Distribution of damage states for Washington state road bridges,
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Road and bridge damage may significantly disrupt 
traffic in Washington’s population centers, as shown 
in Figures 30 and 31. Most of the high damage 
road segments may be concentrated between Seattle 
and Tacoma. Large cracks, loose soil, and landslide 
debris may make this stretch of I-5 impassible until 
major repairs are made. Congested surface streets 
and other alternate routes may make some move-
ment possible, but may add to already lengthy travel 
times. Repair of the urban road system may take 
months to years to complete.
S e at t l e  M e t r o :  R o a d s  a n d  B r i d g e s
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Figure 30. Road and tunnel damage on major highways in the Seattle metropolitan area of Washington
54
Figure 31. Bridge damage on major highways in the Seattle metropolitan area of Washington
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Roughly half of the bridges in Oregon may with-
stand the shaking fairly well and may not interrupt 
transportation. However, over 20 percent of bridges 
may suffer moderate levels of damage and may not 
be able to support even reduced vehicular traffic 
until temporary supports are put in place; and over 
20 percent of bridges – as many as 700 – may either 
completely collapse or be in imminent danger of 
collapse. This damage may be extensive enough as 
to require the complete replacement of the entire 
bridge. General locations of damaged bridges are 
shown in Figures 32 and 33.
Dozens of bridges along the I-5 corridor may suffer 
irreparable damage from the earthquake, and several 
may collapse. The violent shaking along the coast 
may destroy many coastal bridges, especially those 
holding U.S. 101. As shown in Table 11, fifty-five 
percent of the bridges in the coastal corridor may 
suffer high damage. This damage may be extensive 
enough to require the complete replacement of the 
entire bridge. Of the 135 bridges holding U.S. 101, 
as many as one-third may be so heavily damaged 
as to be impassable immediately after the quake. 
Within minutes of the earthquake, the resulting tsu-
nami may send waves of water and debris that may 
inundate a dozen or more coastal bridges.
The overall condition of east-west bridges between 
the coast and the Willamette Valley may be only 
marginally better than those on U.S. 101. Each 
major connecting highway may have at least one 
collapsed or irreparable bridge. 
Bridge damage may significantly impact all of Ore-
gon’s major commercial centers – Portland, Salem, 
Eugene, Corvallis, and Albany – all of which are 
bisected by the Willamette River. In some places, 
bridges spanning rivers may collapse into the river, 
temporarily disrupting shipping channels along 
sections of the Columbia and lower Willamette Riv-
er, preventing the movement of fuels and essential 
recovery equipment by water.
O r e g o n :  R o a d  B r i d g e s
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O r e g o n :  R o a d  B r i d g e s  ( C o n t. )
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Road and bridge damage may significantly disrupt 
traffic flow in downtown Portland, as shown in 
Figures 34 and 35. Bridges outside of the downtown 
core, such as St. Johns, Fremont, Broadway, Steel, 
Burnside, Morrison, Hawthorne, Ross Island, and 
Sellwood — may need to be inspected before they 
are passable. In the immediate hours after the earth-
quake, many of the workers in the downtown core 
of Portland may struggle to get home if they live 
east of the Willamette River. 
Workers who live on the west side of town may also 
have problems getting home. One or more tun-
nels on Highway 26, a major transportation artery 
between Portland and its west-side suburbs, may 
not be passable. Many workers may be stranded in 
the downtown area until bridges and tunnels are 
cleared.  Congested surface streets and other alter-
nate routes may make some movement possible, but 
may add to already lengthy travel times. Repair of 
the urban road system may take months to years to 
complete.
P o r t l a n d  M e t r o :  R o a d s  a n d  B r i d g e s
60
Figure 34. Road and tunnel damage on major highways in the Portland metropolitan area
61
Figure 35. Bridge damage on major highways in the Portland metropolitan area
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A i r  T r a n s p o r tat i o n
Definition: Airport facilities include terminal build-
ings, fuel facilities, and control towers. These, combined 
with the runways, make up airport transportation 
infrastructure.
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, 
air transportation may be the only viable means 
to evacuate residents and deliver supplies to areas 
impacted by the earthquake. However, damaged air-
port facilities and runways may impede emergency 
transport to and from the impacted areas.
Of the 100 airports in the impacted area of Wash-
ington and Oregon, roughly two-thirds may suffer 
medium or greater structural damage from the 
initial earthquake. This damage may be extensive 
enough as to temporarily halt all air traffic in and 
out of these airports. Control towers and terminal 
buildings at high-damage airports may sustain struc-
tural damage severe enough to cause reinforced-steel 
structures to collapse or put the structure in immi-
nent damager of collapse, as illustrated in Figure 36. 
In addition to structural damage, terminals and 
control towers may suffer extensive nonstructur-
al damage. The shaking could cause unanchored 
electrical equipment to fall, breaking connections to 
wire piping and ducts, or it could cause suspended 
ceilings to collapse and some light fixtures to fall, as 
shown in Figure 37. In control towers, this damage 
may obstruct air control and monitoring capabil-
ities. These airports may require a portable con-
trolling facility to operate at a very limited capacity. 
In addition, navigation aids may be downed in 
many areas, affecting air transportation.
Although damage to airports may hamper com-
mercial travel, these damages may not necessarily 
prevent emergency air transport operations. As long 
as runways remain intact and useable, responders 
can carry out these operations regardless of whether 
the airport itself is functional.Figure 36.The Great Alaskan Earthquake in 1964 
caused this reinforced concrete-framed control tower 
to collapse at the Anchorage International Airport. 
Photo: Karl V. Steinbrugge.
Figure 37. In 2014, a M6.9 earthquake near Greece 
caused nonstructural damage to airport at Lemnos 
International Airport in Lemnos, Greece. Photo: Ayis 
Theos.
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Roughly 80 percent of runways may suffer only 
minor to no damage; most of these are in the I-5 
corridor. With appropriate air traffic support, pilots 
may access these runways to carry out emergency 
response operations. Undamaged runways may be 
a critical resource for high-impact areas, especially 
runways long enough to accommodate the type of 
fixed-wing aircrafts typically needed to stage emer-
gency response operations. In Washington and Ore-
gon, 76 of these longer runways exist, but half may 
be damaged beyond use. On the coast, only a few 
of these runways may be used to support response 
operations. 
In the tsunami inundation zones, some smaller 
runways that have enough usable open pavement to 
support helicopters may be functional once the wa-
ter has receded. While helicopters can typically land 
on any level clearing, they are slower and generally 
have a lower carrying capacity than heavier fixed-
winged aircraft. 
Figure 39.Tsunami waves resulting from the 2011 
Tohoku earthquake, inundated the first floor and 
parts of the second floor of the terminal at Sendai 
Airport and littered runways and tarmac with debris. 
Photo: Staff Sgt. Samuel Morse, U.S. Air Force.
Figure 38. The M7.9 Denali earthquake in 2002 
caused significant damage to the only runway at the 
Northway, Alaska airport. The runway was temporarily 
replaced with a gravel surface before permanent 
repairs. Photo: Unknown. 
A i r  T r a n s p o r tat i o n  ( C o n t. )
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Many of the runways in the I-5 corridor of Wash-
ington may sustain little or no damage, with only 
minor cracking and heaving of the pavement. 
Among the surviving runways, several runways ca-
pable of handling C-130 aircraft may be operational 
within hours of the event. 
The terminals and control tower at Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport (SeaTac) may sustain some 
structural damage, including minor cracking to sup-
port beams and columns. While this damage may 
not disrupt air traffic, extensive nonstructural dam-
age may result in a temporary closure. Runways at 
SeaTac may suffer little damage. However, damaged 
roads and bridges adjacent to SeaTac may impede 
ground access. If jet fuel shortages occur because of 
W a s h i n g t o n :  A i r  T r a n s p o r tat i o n
damage to the pipelines that deliver this fuel, air 
transport out of SeaTac and surrounding airports 
may be more difficult. 
The most significant damage may be reported 
at airport facilities along the coast, where soil 
liquefaction may cause large breaks across run-
way pavement and ground settling that collapses 
control towers. As shown in Table 12, 55 percent 
of the airport facilities in the coastal corridor may 
suffer high damage. This damage may render many 
of these facilities unusable by fixed-wing aircraft. 
However, some runways may have enough usable 
open pavement to support helicopters. The loca-
tion of airport facilities is shown in Figure 40.
Table 12. Distribution of damage states for Washington state airport facilities,
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Figure 40. Washington airports in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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Most of the runways in the I-5 corridor of Oregon 
may sustain light damage, with only minor cracking 
and heaving of the pavement. Among the surviving 
runways, over a dozen runways capable of handling 
C-130 aircraft are expected to be operational within 
hours of the event. The Redmond Municipal Air-
port, east of the Cascade Mountains, may be able to 
accept fixed-winged aircraft up to Class 1. However, 
road and bridge damage may limit ground access to 
many airports.  
The terminals and facilities at Portland International 
Airport (PDX) may suffer some damage, with most 
support beams and columns exhibiting minor cracks 
and some showing larger stress cracks. Even with 
only minor damage to the airport structures, unse-
cured equipment in the airport facilities may topple 
over and break, requiring cleanup and replacement 
prior to reopening the facilities. The airport runways 
may suffer damages due to liquefaction and levees 
protecting the airport along the Columbia River 
O r e g o n :  A I R  T R A N S P O R TAT I O N
may fail resulting in possible flooding of the airport. 
Moreover, damage to the pipelines carrying liquid 
jet fuel from Oregon’s critical energy infrastructure 
(CEI) hub may cause jet fuel shortages and limit 
flights out of PDX and surrounding airports. 
The most significant damage may be reported at 
airport facilities along the coast, where soil liquefac-
tion may cause large breaks across runway pavement 
and ground settling that collapses control towers. 
As shown in Table 13, all of the airport facilities in 
the coastal corridor may suffer high damage. This 
damage may render many of these facilities unusable 
by fixed-wing aircraft. However, some runways may 
have enough usable open pavement to support heli-
copters. The location of airport facilies in Oregon is 
shown in Figure 41.
Within minutes of the earthquake, North Bend and 
Astoria airports may be inundated with water from 
the resulting tsunami.
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Figure 41. Oregon airports in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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R a i l  T r a n s p o r tat i o n  S y s t e m s
Definition: The rail transportation system consists of 
tracks/roadbeds, bridges, tunnels, urban stations, main-
tenance facilities, fuel facilities, and dispatch facilities. 
Rail damage may be more disruptive than road 
damage due to the lack of alternative routes. Rail 
systems rely on continual clearance up and down 
the line. Moderate, localized earthquake and land-
slide damage may result in bottlenecks in the rail 
network. This is especially severe in the case of dam-
age to railway bridges. Unlike track repair, which 
could be completed within a month, rail bridges 
may take several months to a year to repair. Table 14 
describes railway track and bridge damage for each 
damage level.
Figure 42. The M 7.4 earthquake in Turkey caused localized 
bending of the rail tracks. Photo: Turkish State Railways.











ing only minor, cosmet-
ic repairs. Bridges can 
support rail traffic even 
before these repairs are 
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of the ground surface 
over extended lengths 
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The majority of rail facilities – such as train sta-
tions, dispatch facilities, and fuel facilities – are 
located along the I-5 corridor. Over three-quarters 
of these facilities may suffer moderate or greater 
damage which may significantly hinder the ability 
to perform essential dispatch and switching control. 
However, rail facilities can be replaced or relocated 
relatively quickly and with few resources.
Most of the railway spurs running west from the 
I-5 corridor may suffer high damage and may be 
completely unusable until the entire spur has been 
checked for damage and repairs made. The major-
ity of rail tracks along the I-5 corridor may suffer 
enough damage to require repair before they are use-
able, hindering transport of export goods, industrial 
components, commuters, or other goods again. Rail 
tracks running east of the Cascades from Oregon 
and Washington may not suffer damage from the 
initial earthquake. However, railway tracks that survive the shaking may be damaged by landslides 
immediately after the earthquake or in the weeks 
and months following the event. 
Five or more mechanical bridges between Portland, 
Oregon and Marysville, Washington may be severely 
damaged by the earthquake. The loss of these bridg-
es may have the biggest impact on rail shipments 
along the I-5 corridor. These bridges may be out of 
commission for six to twelve months while repairs 
are made. The loss of these bridges, coupled with 
damaged track segments up and down the line, may 
result in a complete shutdown of rail traffic along 
I-5 and to the west. 
Until bridge and track repairs are made, commu-
nities between Seattle and Portland, and south of 
Portland, may not have access to rail service of any 
kind.
Figure 44. The M9.2 Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964 
damaged extended lengths of track due to ground failure 
as a result of lateral displacement. This type of ground 
failure can tear rails from their ties and caused them to 
buckle. Photo: USGS. 
Figure 43. The 2011 M 9 Tohoku earthquake caused 
considerable bending of the Hitachinaka Railway tracks. 
Photo: Toshinoei Baba.
R a i l  T r a n s p o r tat i o n  S y s t e m s  ( C o n t. )
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In Washington’s I-5 corridor, roughly half of railway 
track segments may suffer some damage, ranging 
from minor, localized bending of the track to major 
bending over extensive lengths (see Table 15). A few 
segments in the Tacoma area may suffer high dam-
age from major ground settlement under rail tracks. 
As shown in Figure 45, several  railway bridges 
between Seattle and Olympia, as well as the main 
railway bridge spanning the Columbia River, may 
W a s h i n g t o n :  R a i l  D a m a g e s
suffer extensive damage. The loss of these critical 
bridges may halt all rail traffic along the I-5 corri-
dor. Eastbound rail lines may suffer little damage 
and may be used to reroute rail traffic in and out 
of Seattle. However, some of these routes may 
suffer damage from landslides. Until bridge repairs 
are made, which may take six months to a year, 
communities south of Seattle may be isolated from 
rail service.
71













































quiring only minor, 
cosmetic repairs, 
but the bridges can 
support rail traffic 




tally or vertically, 
possibly requiring 







requiring repairs before 
use, but not requiring 
demolition of bridges. 
Bridges may not sup-
port heavy loads and 
will likely require engi-
neering assessments 
before deemed safe for 
traffic.
Considerable bending 
of track requiring repair.
Bridge collapse 
or damages so 




or demolition and 
repair.  
Major bending of 
track due to settle-
ment of railway bed 
or shifting of the 
ground surface over 
extended lengths 
of track.
Table 15. Washington rail facilities in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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Figure 45. Washington railway track and bridges in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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In Oregon’s I-5 corridor, most railway track seg-
ments may suffer some damage, ranging from mi-
nor, localized bending of the track to major bending 
over extensive lengths (see Table 16). Rail segments 
along the Willamette Valley between Portland and 
Eugene may suffer high damage from major ground 
settlement under the rail tracks.
As shown in Figure 46, the main rail bridge that 
crosses the Columbia River and several bridges in 
O r e g o n :  R a i l  D a m a g e s
downtown Portland may suffer damages so severe 
as to make rail transport impossible without exten-
sive repairs or demolition and rebuilding. East-
bound rail lines may suffer little damage and be 
used to reroute rail traffic in and out of Portland. 
However, some of these routes may suffer damage 
from landslides. Until bridge and track repairs 
are made, communities and businesses north and 
south of Portland may be completely isolated from 
rail service.
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O r e g o n :  R a i l  D a m a g e s  ( C o n t. )
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Figure 46. Oregon track and bridges in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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S e a p o r t s
Definition: Port facilities include waterfront structures 
(e.g., wharfs, piers and seawalls), cranes and cargo 
handling equipment, fuel facilities, warehouses, and 
port infrastructure, such as transportation systems and 
utility systems. Intermodal transfer from ships onto 
trucks and trains, or into bulk storage, is required for 
the port to function.
In many cases, port facilities were constructed prior 
to widespread use of engineered fills. Consequently, 
port structures are prone to damage, due to slope 
failure or lateral spreading from liquefaction. Liq-
uefaction-induced soil movement can damage piers, 
wharfs, and seawalls by exerting pressure against the 
retaining structure, causing it to tilt or slide toward 
the water. This outward movement can form deep 
depressions behind retaining walls and damage 
structures on the ground surface, as illustrated in 
Figure 47. These large soil movements can derail 
cranes and warehouses and compromise access to 
shipping terminals. Until the retaining structure is 
repaired, use of areas behind them may be limited 
to light loads. 
Seaports have a complex web of links to other ele-
ments of the overall transportation system. If im-
mediate rail and road access is not available, ports 
will not be able to distribute goods to surround-
ing areas. Tarmacs, access roads, and other paved 
surfaces may experience differential settlement of 
Figure 47. Liquefaction resulting from 1995 M 6.9 Kobe 
earthquake caused high damage to facilities at the Port of 
Kobe. The liquefied soil pushed against a major retaining 
wall causing it to slide five to ten feet toward the water. 
This movement caused settlement of the retained soils and 
destroyed structures supported by these soils. Photo: Koji 
Sasahara, AP. 
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S e a p o r t s  ( C o n t. )











ment, causing minor 
damage to cranes and 
handling equipment. 
Minor repair may be 
required. 
Slight ground settle-
ment causing minor 
cracking of pavement 
and sliding of piers. 
Minor repairs may be 
required.
Slight ground settle-
ment, causing minor 
damage to warehous-
es. Minor repair may 
be required.
Derailment due to 
differential displace-
ment of parallel track. 
Toppled cranes likely 
to occur. Rail repair 





cracking of pavement 





ment due to differ-
ential settlement or 
offset of the ground. 
Rail repair is required.
Considerable damage 
to equipment. Totally 
derailed cranes likely 
to occur. Replacement 
of structural members 
required.
Failure of most piles, 
extensive sliding of 





damage is widespread 
at the port facility.
Major differential set-
tlement of the ground 




S e a p o r t s  ( C o n t. )
several feet or more due to liquefaction. Until these 
surfaces are regraded and resurfaced, marine termi-
nals may only operate at a very limited capacity.
Table 17 lists the physical components of port facil-
ities and provides a description of the damage that 
correlates to low, medium, and high damage states. 
The photos below illustrate port facility damage and 
corresponding damage states.
Figure 49. The 2010 M7 Haitian earthquake caused high 
damage to the main port terminal in Port-au-Prince. 
Seismically induced lateral spreading caused a shipping-
container crane to tilt toward the harbor. Photo: Daniel C. 
Pearson, U.S. Navy. 
Of the 700 individual port facilities within Ore-
gon and Washington, as many as 90 percent may 
be moderately or highly damaged from the initial 
earthquake. This damage may be as minimal as 
cracked decks above piers, slight derailment of 
cranes, or minor displacement of decks in warehous-
es, or as great as to require complete replacement of 
the facility. 
Damaged navigation channels may also affect ma-
rine terminal viability. The Columbia River navi-
gation channel is an engineered structure designed 
to accommodate deep-water vessels. The channel 
extends 100 miles upstream to the ports of Kalama, 
Longview, Portland, and Vancouver. During the 
earthquake, the lateral spreading of channel banks 
and underground landslides may shift sediment into 
navigation channels, trapping deep-water vessels 
in transit in waterways. Bridge or dam failure may 
block access to the channel for an extended period 
of time.
Figure 48. The 2010 Haitian earthquake caused medium 
damage to surrounding facilities, causing shipping 
containers to tumble and warehouses to derail. Ships were 
unable to deliver supplies and aid until repairs were made. 
Photo: U.S. Coast Guard. 
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Figure 51. The 1996 M6.6 Kobe earthquake in Japan caused 
damage to pavement supporting tanks and other facilities. 
Some of Washington and Oregon’s port fuel facilities, such 
as fuel tanks and terminals, are situated on liquefiable soil. 
These facilities could spill or rupture during the earthquake, 
posing serious fire and explosion threats. Photo: HITRAC. 
Figure 50. A tsunami resulting from the 1965 M9.2 
earthquake in Alaska caused significant damage to 
facilities at Seward Port. In addition to infrastructure 
damage, tsunami currents could drastically modify the 
underwater topography near ports, making it difficult or 
even impossible for vessels to navigate. Photo: Mildred 
Kirkpatrick.
S e a p o r t s  ( C o n t. )
When the tsunami arrives, it is likely that debris 
entrained in the waves will scour the navigational 
channels and destroy port facilities along the outer 
coast and mouth of the Columbia River. Navigation 
may be extremely difficult from the mouth of the 
Columbia River to the Portland/Vancouver area. 
The channel may need to be dredged and cleared of 
silt and bridge debris before navigability is restored. 
The lower reaches of the Columbia River may be 
inaccessible for up to a month due to changes in 
navigability. The location of port facilities on the 


















































In the aftermath of the earthquake, Washington’s 
major international seaports – Seattle and Tacoma – 
may suffer damage from ground failure as a result of 
liquefaction. Locations of these ports are shown in 
Figure 53. Ports north of Seattle, such as the ports 
of Bellingham and Anacortes may suffer the least 
amount of damage and may be used to support re-
sponse operations. The most significant port facility 
damage may be along the coast, where the shaking is 
expected to be most intense. As shown in Table 18, 
as much as 78 percent of port facilities in the coastal 
region may suffer high damage. These damaged 
facilities will likely need to be reconstructed.  
Within minutes of the earthquake, the resulting 
tsunami will send waves of water and debris that 
will also likely destroy port facilities along the outer 
coast and mouth of the Columbia River. Although 
the tsunami wave heights may decrease in the inner 
Puget Sound, severe currents may damage ships and 
piers in these inland harbors. If waves get stuck in a 
small port or harbor, heightened currents could last 
for three to four days. 
The earthquake and tsunami may significantly mod-
ify navigation at the mouth of the Columbia River 
such that vessels may be unable to navigate the river 
to the upstream ports of Kalama, Longview, Port-
land, and Vancouver. Because of damage to shipping 
channels, marine transport of petroleum from Puget 
Sound to Portland and other points along the Co-
lumbia River may be difficult immediately following 
the earthquake and tsunami. The lower reaches of 
the Columbia River may be inaccessible for up to a 
month and may need to be dredged and cleared of 
silt and bridge debris before navigability is restored. 
The loss of critical maritime infrastructure across the 
lower reaches of the Columbia River, and in Grays 
Harbor, may greatly impact commercial shipping.
W a s h i n g t o n :  S e a p o r t s
The Cascadia Region is home to a robust fer-
ry transportation system that will be uniquely 
impacted by a major CSZ earthquake. The 
Washington Department of Transportation 
operates the nation’s largest ferry system 
by fleet size and passenger volume. Twenty 
two vessels carry approximately 22 million 
people and 10 million vehicles to and from 
twenty ferry terminals annually. The system 
operates both domestic and internation-
al routes, serving destinations throughout 
Northwest Washington State and Southwest 
British Columbia. Full or partial failure of this 
system after a CSZ earthquake would create 
significant response challenges for island 
communities only accessible, or most easily 
accessible, by existing ferry routes.  
W A s h i n g t o n  s t A t e
f e r r y  s y s t e m
Figure 53. The 1995 M6.6 Kobe earthquake damaged a 
loading ramp structure at Higashi-Kobe ferry pier, along 
with other port infrastructure in the area. Damage to ferry 
facilities could isolate island populations in the San Juan 
Islands and slow transportation across the Puget Sound. 
Photo: unknown.
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Table 18. Distribution of damage states for Washington state port facilities,
by areas of operation
W a s h i n g t o n :  S e a p o r t s  ( C o n t. )
In addition to ports, 50 ferry facilities serve coastal 
communities and communities along Puget Sound 
in Washington. Ferries serving coastal communities 
in Grays Harbor and Port Angeles may suffer high 
damage from the initial earthquake and may be 
destroyed by the tsunami waves and strong currents. 
Most of the ferry facilities in central and southern 
Puget Sound may suffer damage from liquefaction 
and lateral spreading of soil. These facilities may 
need extensive repairs before they can be used. The 
ferry system in the San Juan Islands may suffer only 
minor damage. Until repairs are made, island popu-
lations may be isolated because of the combination 



























of pavement and 
sliding of piers. 
Minor repairs may 
be required. 
Port facil-
ity is fully 
functional.
Broken and damaged 
piles supporting piers/
seawalls. Considerable 
crane and warehouse 
derailment, with some 
toppled cranes. Rail 
repair and some repair 
to structural members 
required.
Extensive damage 
is widespread at the 
port facility. Failure 
of most piles and 
extensive sliding 
of piers. Potential 
for totally derailed 
cranes and derail-
ment of warehous-





Figure 54. Washington seaports in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential 
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In the aftermath of the earthquake, Oregon’s water-
borne transportation infrastructure may suffer severe 
damage from ground failure as a result of liquefac-
tion. As shown in Table 19, as much as ninety-sev-
en percent port facilities in the coastal region may 
suffer high damage. These damaged facilities will 
likely need to be reconstructed. The location of port 
facilities are shown in Figure 55.
Within minutes of the earthquake, the resulting tsu-
nami will send waves of water and debris that will 
likely destroy port facilities along the outer coast 



























of pavement and 
sliding of piers. 
Minor repairs may 
be required. 
Port facil-
ity is fully 
functional.
Broken and damaged 
piles supporting piers/
seawalls. Considerable 
crane and warehouse 
derailment, with some 
toppled cranes. Rail 
repair and some repair 
to structural members 
required.
Extensive damage 
is widespread at the 
port facility. Failure 
of most piles and 
extensive sliding 
of piers. Potential 
for totally derailed 
cranes and derail-
ment of warehous-




Table 19. Distribution of damage states for Oregon port facilities, by areas of operation
and mouth of the Columbia River. The earthquake 
and tsunami may significantly modify navigation at 
the mouth of the Columbia River such that vessels 
may be unable to navigate the river to upstream 
ports. Because of damage to shipping channels, 
marine transport of petroleum from Puget Sound to 
Portland and other points along the Columbia River 
may be difficult immediately following the earth-
quake and tsunami. The lower reaches of the Co-
lumbia River may be inaccessible for up to a month, 
and may need to be dredged and cleared of silt and 
bridge debris before navigability is restored.
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Figure 55. Oregon ports in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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W at e r  r e s o u r c e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
in two nations. Thus, it can be difficult to 
identify who is responsible for which specific 
piece of infrastructure, and what their roles and 
responsibilities are.
A Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and 
tsunami will have direct and indirect impacts on 
the region’s water infrastructure. Water utilities are 
similar to other utilities in this regard as the loss of 
power and other local damages will disrupt service 
until repairs can be completed. Those services can 
be replaced temporarily through various means 
(e.g. bottled water, portable toilets, etc.). Water 
control facilities and systems differ in that they 
feed water to utilities and may have additional 
direct impacts on populated areas that are not 
easily mitigated. These impacts include, but are not 
limited to, the following:
• An increased risk of failure resulting from a 
  loss of structural integrity, requiring the piece 
  of infrastructure to be shut down or operated at 
  minimum levels until assessments and/or repairs 
  are completed.
• Structural failure, possibly resulting in 
   catastrophic flooding, and loss of benefits until 
   the project or system is rebuilt.
 • Loss of baseline power generation for the entire 
   region until repairs can be made, resulting in 
   considerable economic impacts. 
• Loss of transportation and navigation 
   infrastructure until repairs are completed due 
   to flooding of roads, damaged locks, blocked 
   navigation channels, etc.
Water is a critical resource for human 
consumption, agriculture, transportation, power 
generation, and environmental sustainment 
throughout the Cascadia Region. Water 
resources are naturally formed, but collected 
and used through a complex system of physical 
infrastructure designed to store, redirect, and move 
water where it is needed, or to mitigate flooding 
events. This infrastructure includes, but is not 
limited to, the following:
• Water control facilities and systems:
 o Dams and reservoirs (water storage,   
      power generation, flood control benefits,  
    and recreation
 o Canals (navigation, irrigation)
 o Levees, canals, and channels (flood
    control, navigation)
 o Locks (navigation)
• Water utilities:
 o Water distribution systems
 o Storm and sewage drainage systems
 o Water treatment facilities (drinking and  
    wastewater)
Ownership of water resources infrastructure 
depends on the development history of the area 
and is not based on any systematic or consistent 
interstate approach. Federal agency control 
alongside private ownership of infrastructure 
(e.g. dams) on the same river is not uncommon. 
For example, dams on the Columbia River are 
owned and operated by Federal agencies, private 
corporations, public utilities, and individuals 
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D a m s  a n d  L e v e e s
The potential for flood-induced damage from 
the failure of a single dam or levee could result in 
large losses, and significantly compromise rescue 
and recovery efforts. Catastrophic failure of dams 
managed by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers 
is not expected to occur.  However, any federal, 
state, or privately owned dam or levee may sustain 
damage and will require immediate assessment. 
Damage sustained by a dam or levee from the 
initial seismic event will make the structure 
significantly more vulnerable to aftershocks.
Slumping and settlement of embankments caused 
by liquefaction are among the most common 
causes of dam damage. If the dam is full, landslides 
in reservoirs could cause water to overtop the dam, 
resulting in dam failure. Finally, damage to spillway 
gates could lead to an unexpected water release 
resulting in significant flooding. 
Seismic failure of levees during non-flood 
conditions does not pose an inundation hazard. 
However, flooding is possible if heavy rains occur 
and levees are weakened by ground shaking. 
Dams and locks are a vital component for 
navigation along the Columbia River system. 
Redundancy does not exist for these dams and 
locks. Failure of a dam or a lock would significantly 
compromise river navigation for an extended 
period of time. In addition, a collapsed bridge 
obstructing the river channel would also impede 
navigation. Moreover, Portland International 
Airport (PDX) is located adjacent to the Columbia 
River and is protected by a levee system. The 
airport could be impacted by levee failure and 
liquefaction along the Columbia River.
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E l e c t r i c  P o w e r  S y s t e m s
Definition: Generation facilities are the main supply 
components of electric power infrastructure systems. 
A transmission network of circuits, structures, and 
conductors transmit high-voltage power from generat-
ing plants to substations where the voltage is lowered. 
Substations, which house transformers, high voltage 
switches, circuit breakers, and other critical electrical 
equipment, then allocate energy supply to a local distri-
bution area. Electric power must always be in balance 
between the supply and the demand (called the load).
The electric power network supports almost ev-
ery aspect of life in the region. This vast network 
provides the basic infrastructure to light and heat 
homes, run cash registers and keep items cold at 
the local grocer, power equipment at hospitals and 
businesses, pump water and wastewater at munici-
pal treatment plants and gasoline at commercial gas 
stations, amongst many other activities. The fragility 
of some of the electric power network’s components 
and their interconnectedness means this network is 
vulnerable to damages that could cut electricity to 
large portions of the region after a Cascadia event.
Much of the region’s electric power network was 
not initially built to withstand earthquakes. At the 
region’s gas, hydroelectric, nuclear, and other gen-
erating plants, the strong shaking may cause instru-
ments and racks to chatter and unanchored equip-
ment to slide around before crashing to the ground. 
Landslides, liquefaction, and lateral spreading may 
occur across the region’s electric power grid net-
work, which may cause distribution infrastructure 
and transmission tower failures. Fires may be ignited 
from fallen electrical lines throughout the region. At 
substations, seismically vulnerable equipment may 
fail and control buildings may be damaged.
Over half of the region’s electric facilities may suffer 
medium to high damage, resulting in a significant 
loss in load capacity. A description of these damage 
states is provided in Table 20. One thousand substa-
tions or more may be damaged by the earthquake 
and unable to provide service. Most electrical power 
assets on the coast may suffer damage severe enough 
as to render the equipment and structures irrepara-
ble. 
Electric facilities in the I-5 corridor may suffer 
considerable damage to generation plants, and many 
distribution circuits and substations may fail, result-
ing in a loss of over half of the systems load capacity. 
When electric facilities fail, power is rerouted to 
neighboring segments of the network. Protective 
relays may sense the overload and shut down. The 
loss of load capacity from each switch may cause 
cascading blackouts extending much further than 
the impacted area. Within minutes of the initial 
shaking, vast regions of Washington and Oregon 
may experience a complete blackout.
Figure 56. Earthquake damage to substation equipment. 
Photo: BPA Energy
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E l e c t r i c  P o w e r  S y s t e m s  ( c o n t. )




Light damage to generation 
plants, substation equipment, and 
buildings. No transformer damage. 
Repairs completed in a few hours 
to days. Temporary outage period, 
if any.
Considerable damage to genera-
tion plants, substation equipment, 
and buildings. Up to 10% of the 
generation plants have critical 
equipment damage. Up to 25% 
of critical substation equipment is 
damaged. Relays tripped in 50% 
of the substations. Up to 5% of 
the regional power transformers 
are damaged and non-functional.  
Many distribution circuits are dam-
aged, and a few transmission lines 
are non-functional. Up to 10% of 
the substation control buildings are 
damaged and repairs are needed 
to regain functionality. Restoring 
power to meet 90% of demand 
may take weeks to months.
Extensive damage to generation 
plants, substations, and buildings. 
Up to 20% of the generation plants 
have critical equipment damage. 
Up to 50% of critical substation 
equipment is damaged. Relays 
tripped in 75% of the substa-
tions. Up to 15% of the regional 
power transformers are damaged 
and non-functional. A significant 
number of distribution circuits are 
damaged and a large number of 
transmission lines are non-func-
tional. Up to 20% of the substation 
control buildings are damaged and 
repairs are needed to regain func-
tionality. Restoring power to meet 
90% demand may take months to 
one year.
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In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, 
Seattle, Tacoma, and cities within 100 miles of the 
Pacific coastline may experience partial or complete 
blackouts. Sixty-six percent of the electric facilities 
in the I-5 corridor may suffer considerable damage 
to generation plants, and many distribution circuits 
and substations may fail, resulting in a loss of over 
half of the systems load capacity (see Table 21). 
Most electrical power assets on the coast may suffer 
damage severe enough as to render the equipment 
and structures irreparable. Some isolated areas may 
experience outages even if the distribution systems 
and substations in the area are undamaged.
Restoration timelines largely depend on the number 
of utility personnel and contractors available, and 
upon road conditions. Emergency damage repairs to 
the transmission line system in western Washington 
may take weeks to months. In areas where collapsed 
bridges, landslides, and damaged roadways have 
degraded the transportation network, or where fuel 
shortages hamper the ability to send out sufficient 
repair teams, power restoration may be even slower. 
Isolated areas of power outages east of the Cascades, 
where transportation networks are immediately 
functional, may be restored relatively quickly. The 
location of electric facilities is shown in Figures 57 
and 58.
w a s h i n g t o n :  E l e c t r i c  P o w e r
Table 21. Distribution of damage states for Washington electric facilities,
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In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, cities 
within 100 miles of the Pacific coastline may expe-
rience partial or complete blackout. Seventy percent 
of the electric facilities in the I-5 corridor may suffer 
considerable damage to generation plants, and 
many distribution circuits and substations may fail, 
resulting in a loss of over half of the systems load 
capacity (see Table 22). Most electrical power assets 
on the coast may suffer damage severe enough as 
to render the equipment and structures irreparable. 
Some isolated areas may experience outages even if 
the distribution systems and substations in the area 
are undamaged.
Restoration timelines depend largely on the num-
ber of utility personnel and contractors available 
and road conditions.  Emergency damage repairs 
to the transmission line system in western Oregon 
may take weeks to months. In areas where collapsed 
bridges, landslides, and damaged roadways have 
degraded the transportation network, or where fuel 
shortages hamper the ability to send out sufficient 
repair teams, power restoration may be even slower. 
Isolated areas of power outages east of the Cascades, 
where transportation networks are immediately 
functional, may be restored relatively quickly. Fig-
ures 59 and 60 show the location of electric facilities 
in Oregon.
o r e g o n :  E l e c t r i c  P o w e r
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N at u r a l  G a s  S y s t e m s
Definition: The region’s natural gas system consists of 
compressor stations and buried/elevated pipelines.
The natural gas pipeline network is composed of 
one primary natural gas transmission pipeline – The 
Northwest Pipeline – that connects to a network of 
smaller distribution pipelines. 
The Cascadia earthquake may damage portions of 
over 500 miles of natural gas pipeline. Segments 
of the Northwest Pipeline may be inoperable due 
to numerous leaks and breaks along its route from 
the northern Washington border to southwestern 
Oregon. 
Natural gas facilities that maintain the flow of 
these pipelines may also sustain damage from the 
earthquake. Roughly three-quarters of natural gas 
facilities in the impacted area of Washington and 
Oregon may suffer medium to high damage, includ-
ing substantial building, mechanical, and electrical 
equipment damage.
In areas where there are a large number of breaks in 
the distribution network, local distribution compa-
nies may have to shut down the entire local network 
while repairs are made. The process may leave the 
majority of customers in western Washington and 
western Oregon without service. Restoration time-
lines for natural gas depend on location and road 
conditions. Some inland areas may have services 
restored in days. In coastal areas, it may take weeks 
to months to restore services.
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The northern segment of the Northwest Pipeline 
extends from the Canadian border, at Sumas, 
Washington, south to the Washougal Station at the 
Columbia River Gorge. This segment of pipeline 
may experience multiple breaks and leaks, resulting 
in over 150 miles of damaged pipeline.
As shown in Table 23, nearly all of the natural gas 
facilities serving these pipelines may suffer medium 
to high damage, including damaged compressor sta-
tion buildings and electrical equipment. As a result, 
most impacted communities in western Washington 
may lose natural gas service. Figure 61 shows the 
location of natural gas facilities in Washington.
W a s h i n g t o n :  N at u r a l  G a s  S y s t e m s
Table 23. Distribution of damage states for Washington state natural gas facilities,





























Extensive damage to 
building, mechanical 
and electrical equip-
ment. Damage may be 
irreparable.
Compressor build-
ing collapse or 
imminent danger of 
collapse. 
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Figure 61. Washington natural gas facilities and pipelines in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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The southern segment of the Northwest Pipeline 
serving Oregon, begins at the Washougal Station 
on the Columbia River Gorge and terminating in 
southwest Oregon. The earthquake may cause nu-
merous leaks and breaks along this route and other 
segments of pipeline, possibly resulting in over 300 
miles of inoperable natural gas pipeline segments. 
Dozens of natural gas facilities serving these pipe-
lines may suffer medium to high damage, including 
O r e g o n :  N at u r a l  G a s  S y s t e m s
damaged compressor station buildings and electrical 
equipment (see Table 24).
The east-west pipeline connecting to the Northwest 
Pipeline in Portland may only suffer minor dam-
age. After repairs are made to distribution facilities, 
this pipeline may be used to resupply natural gas to 
communities in Oregon. Figure 62 shows the loca-
tion of natural gas facilities in Oregon.
Table 24. Distribution of damage states for Oregon natural gas facilities,
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Figure 62. Oregon natural gas facilities and pipelines in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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R e f i n e d  F u e l  S y s t e m s
Definition: Refined fuel systems consist of pipelines 
and facilities, including refining centers, ports, pump 
stations, terminals, and storage tanks.
The region’s five oil refineries are located along 
the Puget Sound in northwest Washington. These 
refineries receive most of their crude oil feedstock by 
waterborne shipments from Alaska. Shipments are 
also received by rail from the Bakken formation and 
other foreign sources. The remaining crude oil is 
transported by a trans-mountain pipeline that runs 
from the U.S. – Canada border to Mount Vernon, 
Washington. This pipeline supplies approximately 
10 percent of crude feedstock for northwest Wash-
ington refineries. 
Refined fuel products (e.g., gasoline, diesel, aviation 
fuel, etc.) produced at the five Washington refineries 
are distributed throughout the Pacific Northwest 
by ship, truck, and through the Olympic Pipeline. 
Ships carry refined product from terminals in the 
Seattle area to terminals in Portland and along the 
Columbia and Snake Rivers. The Olympic Pipe-
line network along the I-5 corridor from Ferndale, 
Washington to Eugene, Oregon. Some refined 
product is taken from the pipeline system at the 
Columbia River and shipped by barge to inland 
Washington and Idaho. 
The Olympic pipeline network is serviced by sev-
eral pump stations. These pump stations maintain 
the flow of refined fuel products from Washington 
refineries to terminals along the 350-mile route to 
southern Oregon. Refined product terminals store 
and distribute refined product to meet local de-
mand. 
In the impacted area of Washington and Oregon, 
over 400 miles of refined fuel pipeline may be inop-
erable due to numerous breaks and leaks caused by 
the initial earthquake. In addition, segments of the 
crude oil pipeline running from Canada to Mount 
Vernon in northwest Washington may also be inop-
erable due to a number of breaks and leaks along the 
length of the pipeline. 
Many petroleum facilities, including refining cen-
ters, ports, pump stations, terminals, and storage 
tanks may suffer medium to high damage. A de-
scription of this damage is listed in Table 25. Until 
major repairs are made, these facilities may not be 
operational for several months.
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Major ports along the petroleum supply chain may 
suffer damage, including ports along Puget Sound 
that feed refineries, and ports that receive refined 
products. The earthquake and tsunami may block 
access to inland ports by modifying the Columbia 
River navigation channel’s shape. Other navigable 
waterways may be closed to river traffic in places 
where oil products are contaminating waterways.
The loss of waterborne transportation may disrupt 
petroleum distribution systems beyond the damage 
zone. Shortages in western Oregon may cause dis-
ruptions as far east as Spokane, Washington.  
Restoration times depend on the number of repair 
crews available. Fuel distribution infrastructure may 
be inoperable for weeks to months. After gas sta-
tions run out of supplies, finding petroleum to oper-
ate vehicles, generators, air transportation, or other 
equipment may become increasingly difficult. 
R e f i n e d  F u e l  S y s t e m s  ( C o n t. )












Damage to tanks, pumping buildings, 
or loss of power, including backup 
power, for at least a few days.
Malfunction of tank farm for a week 
or so due to loss of backup power, 
extensive damage to various equip-
ment, or considerable damage to 
tanks.
Malfunction of plant for a week or so 
due to loss of power, with damage 
to equipment or tanks. Refineries will 
not function until power is restored.
Considerable damage to mechanical 
and electrical equipment, or buildings 
housing them
Damage to tanks, pumping buildings, 
or loss of power, including backup 
power, for at least a few days.
Complete failure of all elevated 
pipes, or collapse of tanks. 
Extensive damage to or failure of 
tanks, stacks or elevated pipes.
Extensive damage to buildings or to 
pumps rendering them inoperable 
until repaired.
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Washington’s oil refineries may suffer damages from 
the initial earthquake. A few refineries may mal-
function due to loss of electricity and backup power, 
or from damage to various equipment. Two may 
suffer damage severe enough to disrupt operations 
for months. 
As shown in Table 20, over half of Washington’s re-
fined fuel system may suffer high damage. As much 
as 200 miles of pipeline segments, and as many as 
50 facilities, may be damaged. The refined product 
pipeline running from northern Washington to the 
Columbia River may suffer numerous breaks, espe-
cially in areas where the pipeline traverses liquefac-
tion zones. These are predominately located in the 
state’s extensive floodplains. 
All of the pump stations in Washington, the loca-
tion of which are shown in Figure 63, of may expe-
rience damage to pumps or to the buildings housing 
pumps and mechanical equipment. Of the dozen 
plus terminals in Washington located along the 
Olympic Pipeline, nearly all may suffer damages, in-
cluding heavily damaged tanks and broken elevated 
pipes. These terminals may be unable to receive and 
store petroleum from pipelines and ships. However, 
refined product may be trucked directly from the 
refineries to local distributors, but such distribution 
would be dependent on the viability of the road and 
bridge network.
w a s h i n g t o n :  R E f i n e d  F u e l s
Table 26. Distribution of damage states for Washington state refined fuels facilities,
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Figure 63. Washington refined fuel facilities and pipelines in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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Almost all of Oregon’s refined fuel products are 
supplied by refineries in the Puget Sound region 
of Oregon. Refined fuel passes through Oregon’s 
Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI) hub outside of 
Portland. The CEI hub receives refined fuels, either 
by pipeline or by ship, before the product is dis-
tributed throughout Oregon. The refined product 
pipeline system serving the CEI may suffer damage, 
with numerous breaks and leaks along its extent, 
which may result in total loss of refined fuels supply 
from the Olympic Pipeline. Moreover, ships may 
be unable to deliver refined fuels due to the closure 
of the Columbia River navigation channel. The 
location of Oregon petroleum facilities are shown in 
Figure 64.
As shown in Table 27, over half of Oregon’s refined 
fuel systems may suffer high damage. Aside from the 
loss of supplies from pipeline and ship, Oregon may 
be unable to store and distribute fuels locally, due to 
the loss of refined fuel terminals. As a result, western 
Oregon may experience significant shortages in fuel 
supplies. With the CEI out of commission, petro-
leum distribution systems may not be functional 
until major repairs are made.
O r e g o n :  R e f i n e d  F u e l s
Table 27. Distribution of damage states for Oregon refined fuels facilities,
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Figure 64. Oregon refined fuel facilities and pipelines in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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C r i t i c a l  P u b l i c  S a f e t y  F a c i l i t i e s
Definition: Critical Public Safety Facilities are those 
structures necessary for emergency response to, and 
recovery from, a disaster. These facilities include 
Emergency Operation Centers, 9-1-1 dispatch cen-
ters, fire stations, and police stations.
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, po-
lice, fire, and other emergency personnel will begin 
their response to an event of massive scale. Yet, 
nearly half of all police, fire, and ambulance facilities 
in the impact area of Washington and Oregon may 
suffer moderate or greater damage, compromising 
response capabilities.
On the coast, most of the critical public safety 
facilities and the vehicles housed at the facilities, 
may suffer high damage from the violent shaking. 
Those facilities on the coastal plain that survive the 
earthquake may be inundated by tsunami waves 
moments later. The loss of these critical facilities’ 
services may put pressure on critical facilities in 
surrounding communities, further complicating 
response operational coordination. 
Damaged facilities may lose access to basic ser-
vices, such as power, water, and sewer (though 
most facilities have emergency back-up power). A 
description of damage states in terms of building 
damage and functionality, is provided in Table 28. 
Disruptions in communications may be a wide-
spread problem throughout emergency response 
operations. Local-emergency response facilities may 
be overwhelmed by the high volume of emergency 
calls, causing cellular and 9-1-1 phone systems to 
crash. Widespread damage to roadways and bridges 
may limit access to many critical facilities along the 
coast. Emergency-response personnel may struggle 
to access those injured in the event and may even 
have trouble reporting to work. Some critical facil-
ities may need to run on backup generators due to 
electric power outages.
Figure 65. EOCs will activate following the 
earthquake, but challenges in maintaining staffing 
coupled with facility damages may hinder operational 
coordination. Photo: Unknown.
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C r i t i c a l  P u b l i c  S a f e t y  F a c i l i t i e s
( c o n t. )







Facility is structurally 
sound and able to 
be occupied, though 
damage to interior 
contents may make 
immediate use more 
difficult.
Visible cracks in walls 
and windows.
Facility is damaged 
and may need repair 
before full occupation 
is possible.  
Large cracks in walls, 
columns and partial 
ceiling collapse, loss of 
power and utilities.
Facility is not accessi-
ble.  
Building shifted off of 
foundation, collapsed 
or in imminent danger 
of collapse.
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As emergency operation centers activate across the 
region, the capabilities of state, tribal, and lo-
cal Emergency Operation/Coordination Centers 
(EOC/ECCs) to provide situational awareness may 
be limited due to power outages and disruptions in 
communications across the region. Some EOCs may 
need to run on backup generators. Over time, as 
E m e r g e n c y  O p e r at i o n  C e n t e r s
Washington and Oregon have a network of Public 
Safety Answering Point (PSAP) facilities that operate 
as 9-1-1 call centers and are sometimes co-located 
with county or municipal EOCs. PSAPs receive noti-
fications and calls for service from the public, dis-
patch (via radio and/or computer) the needed public 
safety field units (police, fire, etc.), and respond to 
requests from the public safety field units themselves. 
Residents also frequently utilize the PSAP system to 
report power outages, natural gas leaks, water main 
breaks, etc.; the information is then relayed to the 
appropriate utility. 
If after a CSZ earthquake event, cell towers are ren-
dered inoperable, telephone lines are down, “repeat-
P u B l i C  s A f e t y  A n s W e r i n g  P o i n t s  ( P s A P s )
er” stations are impaired, or the PSAP communication 
infrastructure is overloaded, damaged or otherwise 
compromised, critical gaps in this public safety re-
source will be created. Not only will PSAPs be unable 
to communicate with citizens and field units, but 
emergency response personnel will not be able to 
communicate with one another. Disruption in PSAP 
service would create a situation of extreme danger to 
the public, law enforcement and firefighting person-
nel, and other first responders. Additionally, PSAPs 
that remain structurally intact after a CSZ earthquake 
may experience limited operations, if staff members 
cannot reach the facility because of transportation 
system damage.
battery life fades and fuel shortages occur, key EOCs 
may experience failure of some backup supporting 
and communications systems. Emergency-response 
personnel may have to develop alternative ways to 
distribute public messages directing survivors to 
their support areas. 
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F i r e  S tat i o n s
Numerous fires may ignite from downed electric 
lines and broken natural gas pipelines caused by 
the earthquake. Fire stations across the region may 
experience high emergency incident volumes but 
the disruptions in communications may make it 
challenging to estimate the scope and severity of the 
situation. Estimates indicate that roughly 40 percent 
of fire service facilities may suffer medium to high 
structural building damage from the initial CSZ 
earthquake. Many of these facilities may need repair 
before they can be occupied. 
Additionally, damage to water supply pipelines, 
plants, and pumps, may render most fire hydrants 
useless. This combination of direct damage to fire 
facilities and potential water shortages, combined 
with limited road access and disruptions in emer-
gency communications systems, may significantly 
compromise the ability of local fire departments to 
respond. Firefighters may have to draft water from 
lakes, rivers, and reserves to fight fires in urban and 
suburban areas, or rely on tankers to move water.
Figure 66.  Liquefaction from the 2011 M6.3 earthquake 
in Christchurch, New Zealand trapped a fire engine in silt. 
Unnavigable road conditions could hinder emergency 
response efforts throughout Washington and Oregon.
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The majority of fire stations in the I-5 corridor may 
sustain only low structural damage from the initial 
earthquake. Jammed overhead doors and other non-
structural damage may impede immediate access to 
fire trucks and equipment. With minor repair, these 
facilities may be usable shortly after the earthquake. 
As shown in Table 29, 58 percent of fire facilities in 
the coastal corridor may suffer high damage, and 
W a s h i n g t o n :  F I r e  S tat i o n s
may not be accessible for an extended period of 
time. Their locations are shown in Figures 67-69. 
Facilities in the tsunami inundation zone that sur-
vive the earthquake could potentially be destroyed 
by incoming waves. Nearly half of the fire stations 
serving Grays Harbor County may be inundated 
by tsunami waters.
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Figure 69. Seattle-Tacoma metro region fire stations in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential 
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The majority of fire stations in the I-5 corridor 
may suffer high structural damage from the initial 
earthquake. Some fire stations around Portland may 
still be functional immediately after the earthquake. 
However, jammed overhead doors and other non-
structural damage may impede immediate access to 
fire trucks and equipment
O r e g o n :  F i r e  S tat i o n s
As shown in Table 30, 85 percent of fire facilities in 
the coastal corridor may suffer high damage from 
the initial earthquake and may not be accessible for 
an extended period of time. Some of the facilities 
within the inundation zone that survive the earth-
quake could potentially be destroyed by incoming 
waves. The location of fire stations in Oregon is 
shown in Figures 70-72.
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 Figure 72. Portland metro region fire stations in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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P o l i c e  S tat i o n s ,  S u p p o r t i n g
I n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  L a w
E n f o r c e m e n t  a n d  C o r r e c t i o n s 
P e r s o n n e l
There are over 400 police facilities in the impact-
ed area of Washington and Oregon. Roughly half 
may suffer medium to high damage from the initial 
earthquake. The added impacts of power outages, 
degraded transportation networks, loss of traditional 
dispatch, phone and email communication, restrict-
ed ability to fuel and maintain vehicles, etc. will 
diminish the police force’s ability to provide traffic 
and crowd control, prevent crime, arrest violators, 
and protect survivors. Additionally, three quarters 
of all correctional facilities may sustain medium 
to high damage, thus limiting the ability for law 
enforcement to lodge arrestees. 
Beyond the obvious concerns precipitated by the 
damage to infrastructure as noted above, it is critical 
to point out that many law enforcement and cor-
rections personnel may themselves be unable to 
report for duty. Contemporaneously, there may be 
an exponential increase in the demand for police 
resources due to the catastrophic nature of a CSZ 
event; even more police or corrections resources may 
be required if it is necessary to relocate inmates from 
damaged jail or prison facilities. 
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Most of the police stations serving communities in 
the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area may suffer 
minimal damage. As shown in Table 31, over half 
of the police stations in Washington’s I-5 corridor 
may suffer no to low damage and may be immedi-
ately functional at a somewhat reduced level. Police 
stations located south of Olympia and throughout 
the coastal region may suffer higher levels of dam-
age and may be inaccessible until repairs are made. 
Some of police stations in the tsunami inundation 
zone that survive the earthquake may potentially be 
destroyed by incoming waves. 
W a s h i n g t o n :  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t
The ability of state, local, and tribal law enforce-
ment agencies to maintain public order for the 
affected areas, as well as the ability of corrections 
officers to maintain jail and prison facilities, may 
be limited during response operations. Power 
outages, loss of standard communications services, 
poor transportation access, and personnel shortages 
may further diminish response capabilities. The 
location of police stations in Washington, in rela-
tion to earthquake shaking intensity, is provided in 
Figures 73-75.
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Figure 75. Seattle-Tacoma metro region police stations in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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In the aftermath of the earthquake, only a couple 
dozen police stations in Oregon’s population centers 
may suffer minor structural damage and may be 
immediately functional at a somewhat reduced level. 
As shown in Table 32, 55 percent of police stations 
in the I-5 corridor and ninety-four percent in the 
coastal region may suffer high damage and may be 
inaccessible until repairs are made. 
The ability of state, local, and tribal law enforce-
ment agencies to maintain public order for the 
O r e g o n :  L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t
affected areas, as well as the ability of corrections 
officers to maintain jail and prison facilities, may 
be limited during response operations. Power 
outages, loss of standard communications services, 
poor transportation access, and personnel shortages 
may further diminish response capabilities. The 
location of Oregon police stations, in relation to 
shaking intensity is provided in Figures 76-78.
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Figure 78. Portland metropolitan region police stations in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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H o s p i ta l s
In the hours and days after the initial event, tens of 
thousands of survivors will flood hospitals seeking 
treatment for minor cuts, broken bones, and other 
injuries, including life-threatening trauma injuries. 
At the same time, the majority of hospitals may suf-
fer medium to high damage, resulting in the loss of 
hundreds of regular and critical beds needed to treat 
the influx of injured survivors.
Structural damage may vary depending on the 
building type, age of construction, and building 
location. The greatest amount of structural damage 
may be along the coast, where the shaking is most 
intense. However, widespread nonstructural damage 
may have an equal or greater impact on hospitals’ 
ability to function. Broken pipes and ducts, dis-
lodged equipment, fallen ceilings, elevator counter-
weight damage, and water damage from sprinkler 
systems can force structurally sound hospitals to 
shut down.
Figure 79. A hospital in Sylmar, California only suffered 
minor structural damage from the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. However, a broken sprinkler pipe caused water 
damaged to the hospital. This type of damage can force 
hospitals to temporally shut down. At another facility, a 
damaged water tank on the roof leakd up to two feet of 
water at some locations. Photo: FEMA. 
Figure 80. In the 1994 Northridge earthquake high damage 
to hospitals and medical facilities limited medical response 
to injured survivors and patients with on-going medical 
needs. Photo: M. Celebi, USGS.
In addition to structural and nonstructural damage, 
some hospitals may have to contend with the loss 
of essential utilities such as power, water, sewer, and 
medical supplies. 
In coastal areas, ground transportation damage may 
prevent survivors from reaching clinics and hospi-
tals. It may also make it challenging for essential 
medical personnel – doctors, specialists, and nurses 
– to report to work. 
Because of these damages and associated challenges, 
as many as 24,000 hospital patients may require 
evacuation from the impacted areas of Washington 
and Oregon. 
Hospitals in large urban areas and communities east 
of the coastal mountains may be heavily affected by 
a surge of injured and dying survivors. For hospitals 
within 250 miles of the highly impacted coastal 
zones, this surge may be so great as to overwhelm 
their capacity for regular inpatient care.  As a result, 
as many as 20 hospitals on the coast and 100 in the 
I-5 corridor may require augmentation.
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In Washington, over one-quarter of hospitals may 
suffer structural and nonstructural damage severe 
enough as to require the evacuation of patients (see 
Table 33). Several of these hospitals may collapse 
or may be in imminent danger of collapse. On the 
high range of estimates, as many as 15,000 hospital 
patients may require evacuation from these hospi-
tals. 
Most of the hospital evacuation needs will likely be 
in the I-5 corridor, where as many as 10,000 pa-
tients may need to be relocated to other hospitals 
outside of the impacted region. At the same time, 
roughly one-quarter of hospitals in the I-5 corridor 
may suffer damage significant enough to force the 
hospital to operate at limited capacity. 
In coastal areas, close to half of the hospitals may 
suffer high damage, requiring the evacuation of as 
W a s h i n g t o n :  H o s p i ta l s
many as 500 hospital patients. Other coastal hos-
pitals may be forced to operate at limited capacity. 
However, ground transportation damage may 
make it difficult or even impossible for survivors to 
reach functioning hospitals. 
Roughly 40 percent of the hospitals in Washington 
may only suffer minor damage and remain oper-
ational. These hospitals may be capable of caring 
for their own patients. However, the increased 
demand for medical treatment coupled with the 
loss of capacity from other damaged hospitals may 
overwhelm their capacity for regular patient care. 
Dozens of hospitals may require augmentation. 
The location of Washington hospitals, in relation 
to shaking intensity, is provided in Figures 81-83.
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Figure 83. Seattle-Tacoma metro region hospitals in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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In Oregon, over half of the hospitals in the impact-
ed area may suffer structural damage severe enough 
to require immediate evacuation. Some of these hos-
pitals may collapse or may be in imminent danger 
of collapse. On the high range of estimates, as many 
as 9,000 hospital patients may require evacuation 
from these hospitals. 
Most of the hospital evacuation need is in the I-5 
corridor where as many as 7,000 patients may need 
to be relocated to other hospitals. At the same time, 
roughly half of hospitals in the I-5 corridor may suf-
fer damage significant enough to force the hospital 
to operate at limited capacity. 
As shown in Table 34, 96 percent of hospitals in the 
coastal corridor may suffer high damage, requiring 
O r e g o n :  H o s p i ta l s
the evacuation of as many as 600 hospital patients. 
Due to ground transportation damage, these 
patients may need to be evacuated via water or air 
transport. 
A few hospitals may suffer only minor damage and 
remain operational. These hospitals may be capa-
ble of caring for their own patients. However, the 
increased demand for medical treatment coupled 
with the loss of capacity from other damaged 
hospitals may overwhelm their capacity for regu-
lar patient care. Dozens of hospitals may require 
augmentation. Figures 84-86 plots the location of 
hospitals in Oregon.
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Figure 86. Portland metro region hospitals in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
137
S c h o o l s
The impacted area of Washington and Oregon 
contains over 5,000 schools and shelters listed in 
the National Shelter System (NSS) database. School 
types include: public and private K-12, college or 
university, and professional trade school. Following 
the earthquake and tsunami, many schools of these 
may be needed by local communities to serve as tri-
age centers, distribution points for emergency sup-
plies, and emergency shelters, especially those that 
have the capacity to hold a large number of people. 
However, many schools may not be immediately 
functional after the earthquake. Roughly two-thirds 
of the schools in the impacted area may suffer me-
dium to high damage, rendering them immediately 
unavailable for sheltering. Table 35 provides de-
scriptions of each damage state for school buidlings. 
Schools and campuses with the greatest level of 
damage may be older buildings or those located on 
poor soils that are susceptible to liquefaction. 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, schools may 
struggle to meet their immediate obligations of shel-
tering and connecting children with their parents. 
Both the season and the time of day during which 
Figure 87. Following the 2011 M9.2 Tohoku earthquake 
classrooms like this one at Ando Elementary School were 
used as evacuation shelters. Functional school facilities can 
be utilized as temporary shelters for those displaced by the 
earthquake. Photo: Kiyoshi Ota, Getty Images.
Figure 88. The 2010 Baja California M7.2 earthquake 
caused extensive damage to Jefferson Elementary School 
in Calexico, California, such that the school was closed for 
the remainder of the semester. Interior damage and fallen 
items could injure or kill students and faculty. Photo: Kelly 
B. Hutson.
the earthquake and tsunami strike will have pro-
found implications for the region’s children. Events 
that strike during school hours occur while families 
are separated. School staff may be charged with 
keeping large numbers of scared students safe while 
parents struggle to reunite with their children. These 
attempts at reunification may extend well beyond 
school hours, especially for students whose parents 
or guardians have been injured or who need to travel 
on degraded transportation networks. Some parents 
may never arrive and social services will need to 
search for relatives and temporary homes for these 
students. Where school buildings are vulnerable to 
seismic shaking or tsunami inundation, or where 
staff have not ensured that heavy shelving, signage, 
and equipment are properly secured, students and 
staff may be injured in the event, and staff may need 
to respond to these injuries with the supplies and 
knowledge that they have at hand. Were the event 
to happen as students are being bussed to or from 
school, reunification may be complicated by parent 
confusion, damaged transportation infrastructure, 
and high child-to-adult ratios on most buses. 
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Universities, community colleges, and vocational/
trade schools present many unique emergency re-
sponse challenges after a major earthquake. 
Schools with on-campus housing will need to con-
sider the reunification and mass care needs of their 
resident population. All students, including those 
living off campus, may need assistance contacting 
their parents or guardians and making temporary 
living arrangements. It is unlikely that international 
students will be able to return to their home coun-
S c h o o l s  ( C o n t. )
tries immediately and will require temporary living 
accommodations alongside students with domestic 
origins.
Many of the Region’s universities and colleges have 
large residence halls and other on-campus facilities 
(e.g. sporting venues, cafeterias, auditoriums, etc.) 
that could prove useful to broader community mass 
care efforts. Schools will need to balance requests to 
utilize these assets with their duty to care for their 
student, faculty, and staff populations. 
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As shown in Table 36, half of the school buildings 
in the I-5 corridor may suffer no to low structural 
damage and may be immediately occupied. How-
ever, damage to interior contents, loss of power, 
and damaged utilities may impact usability. Most of 
these schools may need inspection and repair, but 
should be usable within a short time. 
Schools south of Tacoma and on the coast may be 
particularly hard hit; nearly all may suffer medium 
to high damage. Many of these school may require 
extensive repair before they can be occupied and 
some may suffer unrepairable damage and may need 
to be demolished and rebuilt. 
W a s h i n g t o n :  S c h o o l s
Within minutes of the earthquake, the resulting 
tsunami may send waves of water and debris that 
inundate several schools along the coast. In the 
heavily impacted coastal zones, it may take over 
a year for schools to be fully repaired or rebuilt 
and for students to return to traditional classroom 
settings. In less impacted areas, the recovery may 
take months, or less.  The loss of these facilities will 
likely cause a high level of distress in the affected 
communities. Figures 89-91 show the location of 
schools in Washington.


























damage and can 
be immediately 
occupied. However, 
damage to interior 
contents, loss of 
power, damaged 





School building suffers 
damages that make 
immediate occupancy 
unlikely. Shoring up of 
damaged structural el-
ements and other more 
costly and time-consum-
ing repairs likely need-
ed before the school 




may include partial 
or full collapse. 
Immediate occu-
pancy is impossible. 
Repairs will be 
extensive. Many 
buildings need to 
be demolished and 










































































Figure 91. Seattle-Tacoma metro schools in relation to shaking intensity
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As shown in Table 37, nearly all schools in the I-5 
corridor and coastal region may suffer medium 
to high damage and may require extensive repair 
before the schools may be occupied again. Schools 
on the coast may be particularly hard hit; nearly all 
may suffer high damage. Many of these school may 
require extensive repair before they can be occupied 
and some may suffer unrepairable damage and may 
need to be demolished and rebuilt.
O r e g o n :  S c h o o l s
Within minutes of the earthquake, the resulting 
tsunami may send waves of water and debris that 
inundate several schools along the coast. In the 
heavily impacted coastal zones, it may take over 
a year for schools to be fully repaired or rebuilt 
and for students to return to traditional classroom 
settings. In less impacted areas, the recovery may 
take months, or less. The loss of these facilities will 
likely cause a high level of distress in the affected 
communities. Figures 92-94 show the location of 
schools in Oregon.
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Figure 94. Portland metro region schools in relation to shaking intensity 
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Definition: The water and wastewater infrastructure 
includes the potable water storage and delivery system 
and the collection and conveyance of wastewater efflu-
ent to sewage treatment plants within a community
The region’s water and wastewater systems – its 
system of pipelines, treatment plants, and pumping 
stations – stretch across large areas. Many pipelines 
stretch across soils that may liquefy during an earth-
quake; treatment plants are often also necessarily 
situated on river banks and coastlines where soils are 
weak and liquefiable. 
Following a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake 
and tsunami, the region’s access to potable water 
may be drastically reduced. During the earthquake, 
old concrete and cast iron pipes buried in liquefied 
soil may crack or break and modern PVC pipelines 
may pull apart at joints. In either situation, the 
damage may result in a total loss of water pressure at 
homes, businesses, hospitals, and other facilities. 
Of the potable water facilities in Washington and 
Oregon, 88 percent may sustain medium to high 
damage. These damage states are described in Table 
38. Water distribution pipes for fighting fires may be 
equally damaged. Broken fuel lines and fallen power 
W at e r  a n d  w a s t e
w at e r t r e at m e n t  F a c i l i t i e s
lines may ignite hundreds of fires across the region, 
yet fire hydrants may not have the water or water 
pressure needed to fight fires.
Potable water may be unavailable for weeks to 
months in coastal areas, and with damage to trans-
portation networks, delivering water to isolated 
coastal communities may be challenging. With 
breakages across the region, water may not be 
completely restored for several months, and possibly 
years. 
Damage to wastewater systems may have even 
greater impacts on communities. Concrete and PVC 
pipes carrying waste water to treatment plants may 
crack or pull apart, flooding streets with raw sewage 
and backing it up into home toilets. Damage to 
equipment and pipe connections or a loss of power 
pumping stations may have similar impacts. 
Of the wastewater facilities in Washington and Ore-
gon, 77 percent may suffer medium to high damage. 
This damage may be severe enough to shutdown 
wastewater treatment plants and lift-stations for a 
week or longer. Facilities suffering high damage may 
be irreparable. 
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W at e r  a n d  w a s t e w at e r
t r e at m e n t  F a c i l i t i e s  ( C o n t. )
















age or loss of electric 
power and back-up 
power for a short time 
(less than three days).
Minor damage to the 
tank roof due to water 
sloshing, minor cracks 
in concrete tanks, or 
localized wrinkles in 
steel tanks.
Loss of electric power 
and backup power, 
resulting in temporary 
malfunction for less 
than three days. 
Sedimentation basins, 
chlorination tanks, or 
chemical tanks may 
suffer slight damage. 
Loss of water quality 
may occur.
Considerable damage 
to mechanical and 
electrical equipment, 
moderate to extensive 
building damage, or 
the loss of electric 
power for about a 
week. Damage to 
pumps may be 
beyond repair.
Considerable to 
severe damage to 
tanks, resulting in loss 
of content. In some 
cases, tanks may go 
out of service.beyond 
repair.
Loss of electric power and 
backup power, resulting 
in malfunction for about a 
week. Extensive damage 
to various equipment, 
considerable damage to 
sedimentation basins, 
considerable damage to 
chlorination tanks with 
no loss of contents, or 
considerable damage to 
chemical tanks. Loss of 
water quality is imminent. 
Damaged pipes connect-
ing to basins and chemical 
units, which may result in 
a shutdown of the plant.
Pumping plant build-
ing collapse.
Storage tank collapse 
and loss of contents.
Complete failure of 
pipings, or extensive 
damage to the filter 
gallery.
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W at e r  a n d  w a s t e w at e r
t r e at m e n t  F a c i l i t i e s  ( C o n t. )
At waterfront treatment facilities, earthquake shak-
ing may cause facilities to shift towards water banks 
and sever connecting pipes. Breaks in main trunk 
lines will affect larger regions than failures in pipes 
or pumping stations in upper sections of the sewer 
system. 
When wastewater treatment plants fail, raw sewage 
may discharge into nearby lakes and rivers. Rivers 
may quickly become polluted with untreated sew-
age, contaminating drinking sources and spread-
ing waterborne disease. These failures may further 
impact community health and safety if healthcare 
facilities have to operate with limited water.
Figure 95. Pipes carrying potable water may be damaged 
or contaminated, leaving many survivors without a critical 
resource. Breaks in wastewater pipes can confound this 
issue, causing sewage backup into streets, plumbing, 
and other damaged pipe infrastructure. Photo: Vitelmo V. 
Bertero.
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Washington’s water and wastewater systems may 
be severely disrupted in the aftermath of the earth-
quake. Much of the potable water systems in the 
Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan region may suffer 
medium damage, including widespread breaks and 
leaks. Where service is available, however, cracked 
pipelines may result in contaminated water supply. 
The most substantial damage to potable water sys-
tems may be on the coast and in the coastal moun-
tain chain, where the shaking is most intense. As 
shown in Table 39, all of the potable water facilities 
in the coastal region may suffer medium to high 
damage and may be unavailable until major repairs 
are made. Delivering repair materials and drinking 
water to coastal communities, isolated due to road 
W a s h i n g t o n :  W at e r  a n d  W a s t e w at e r 
T r e at m e n t
damage, may be a challenge. It may be several 
weeks to half a year before coastal communities 
have access to potable water systems.
Most of the wastewater infrastructure in the im-
pacted area of Washington may suffer some level of 
damage. Widespread sewage release and sewer-line 
backups may result in a shutdown of the system 
until repairs are completed. Restoration timelines 
could be three weeks to seven months, with the 
greatest damage and longest restoration times near 
the coastline. Complete restoration of some dam-
aged wastewater systems could take several years. 
Figures 96 and 97 show the location of water and 
wastewater facilities in Washington.
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Table 39. Distribution of damage states for Washington state potable water and wastewater 
facilities, by areas of operation
W a s h i n g t o n :  W at e r  a n d
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power and backup 
power, resulting in 
temporary malfunc-
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occur. Minor water 
storage tank dam-

















Loss of electric power 
and backup power, 
resulting in malfunc-
tion for about a week. 
Loss of water quality is 
likely. Damaged pipes 
connecting to basins 
and chemical units, 
which may result in 
a shutdown of treat-
ment plant. Damage to 
pumps and lift-stations 
may be beyond repair. 
Considerable to severe 
damage to water stor-
age tanks, resulting in 
loss of content.
Complete failure of 
pipings, or exten-
sive damage to 
the filter gallery at 
treatment plant.  























































































































































Oregon’s water and wastewater systems may be se-
verely disrupted in the aftermath of the earthquake. 
Much of the potable water systems in the Portland 
metropolitan region may suffer medium damage, in-
cluding widespread breaks and leaks. Where service 
is available, cracked pipelines may result in contami-
nated water supply. 
The most substantial damage to potable water sys-
tems may be on the coast and in the coastal moun-
tain chain, where the shaking is most intense. As 
shown in Table 40, all of the potable water facilities 
in the coastal region may suffer medium to high 
damage and may be unavailable until major repairs 
are made. Delivering repair materials and drinking 
water to coastal communities, isolated due to road 
O r e g o n :  W at e r  a n d
W a s t e w at e r  T r e at m e n t
damage, may be a challenge. It may be several 
weeks to half a year before coastal communities 
have access to potable water systems.
Most of the wastewater infrastructure in the 
impacted area of Oregon may suffer some level of 
damage. Widespread sewage release and sewer-line 
backups may result in a shutdown of the system 
until repairs are completed. Restoration timelines 
could be three weeks to seven months, with the 
greatest damage and longest restoration times near 
the coastline. Complete restoration of some dam-
aged wastewater systems could take several years. 
Figure 98 and 99 show the location of water and 
wastewater facilites in Oregon.
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O r e g o n :  W at e r  a n d
W a s t e w at e r  T r e at m e n t  ( C o n t. )
Table 40. Distribution of damage states for Oregon potable water and wastewater facilities, 
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Loss of electric power 
and backup power, 
resulting in malfunc-
tion for about a week.  
Loss of water quality 
is imminent. Damaged 
pipes connecting to 
basins and chemical 
units, which may result 
in a shutdown of treat-
ment plant. Damage to 
pumps and lift-stations 
may be beyond repair. 
Considerable to severe 
damage to water stor-
age tanks, resulting in 
loss of content.
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H a z a r d o u s  M at e r i a l s  F a c i l i t i e s
As many as 80 chemical facilities in Washington and 
Oregon may suffer medium or greater damage from 
the initial earthquake. Industrial sites with tanks 
and pipes holding nitric acid or nitrate compounds 
may overturn or rupture in the violent shaking. 
These damaged facilities, tanks and pipes may 
release noxious gases or leak life-threatening chemi-
cals onto the ground and into bodies of water. Even 
in undamaged, but open-topped tanks, chemicals 
may slosh around and spill. Where these releases are 
flammable (e.g. ruptured gas lines) fires may ignite.
Some damaged facilities may release life-threatening 
ingestible and inhalable chemicals, such as ammonia 
and chlorine, which may pose the greatest immedi-
ate health threat for those in the immediate vicinity 
of the release. These immediate threats may add to 
widespread lower-risk releases from damaged storage 
tanks, breaks in oil and gas pipelines, and toxic 
dust and debris from collapsed buildings. Yet, in 
the immediate aftermath, the number of hazardous 
spills may be underreported due to disruptions in 
standard reporting mechanisms. 
Areas affected by hazardous material releases may 
face a range of emergency management problems 
that slow response. Disruptions in public message 
distribution systems may prevent the dissemination 
of life-saving warning messages to affected commu-
nities. Fires and HAZMAT releases may constrain 
movement into affected areas, which may hamper 
search and rescue operations. Hazardous materials 
may contaminate drinking water, which may pose a 
Figure 100. Shaking from the 1983 M6.5 Coalinga 
earthquake caused the pipe connections to break at a 
Chevron facility. Oil spilled out of the damaged connection, 
but was retained by dikes. Photo: Karl V. Steinbrugge.
threat for those in the immediate vicinity, but may 
also pose a threat to surrounding communities. 
Adding to the complexity of the problem, tsunami 
and flood waters may inundate chemical facilities 
along the shoreline, picking up and carrying harm-
ful chemicals with the incoming waters. As the 
tsunami slams into homes, businesses, and farms it 
may be contaminated with common chemicals and 
fuels found in cleaning and construction supplies, 
appliances, fertilizers stocks, and farm animal excre-
ment. As the water recedes, the contaminants picked 
up by the tsunami may cause widespread, low-level 
contamination in inundated areas along the coast, 
posing health risks to both survivors and responders.
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In the impacted areas in Washington, there are over 
one thousand facilities with reportable quantities of 
extremely hazardous substances (EHS). According 
to the state’s reporting threshold, an even higher 
number, around 3,000 facilities, have reportable 
quantities of less dangerous materials. The severity 
of hazardous releases may be unknown due to dis-
ruptions in HAZMAT reporting mechanisms. 
HAZMAT facilities in the impacted area of Wash-
ington and the corresponding shaking intensity are 
shown on Figures 101 and 102. In addition to pos-
sible damage caused by the intense shaking, tsunami 
waves will likely inundate a few chemical facilities 
along the coastline.  
W a s h i n g t o n :  H a z a r d o u s
M at e r i a l s  F a c i l i t i e s
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Figure 101. Washington facilities with hazardous material in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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Figure 102. Seattle-Tacoma metro region facilities with hazardous material in relation to shaking intensity and 
landslide potential
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In the impacted areas of Oregon, there are nearly a 
thousand facilities that have reportable quantities of 
Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHS). According 
to the state’s reporting threshold, approximately 
18,000 facilities have reportable quantities of less 
dangerous materials. The severity of hazardous 
releases may be unknown due to disruptions in 
HAZMAT reporting mechanisms. 
The HAZMAT facilities in the impacted area of 
Oregon and the corresponding shaking intensity are 
shown on Figures 103 and 104. In addition to pos-
sible damage caused by the intense shaking, tsunami 
waves will likely inundate a couple chemical facili-
ties along the coastline.
O r e g o n :  H a z a r d o u s
M at e r i a l s  F a c i l i t i e s
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Figure 103. Oregon facilities with hazardous material in relation to shaking intensity and landslide potential
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Figure 104. Portland metro region facilities with hazardous materials in relation to shaking intensity and 
landslide potential
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C o m m u n i c at i o n  S y s t e m s
Definition: Communication systems consist of central 
offices and broadcasting stations, transmission lines 
connecting central offices, and cabling. A communi-
cation facility consists of a building, unanchored or 
anchored central switching equipment, and backup 
fuel or battery generators. 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, all 
forms of communication may be disrupted – at a 
time when they are needed most. Survivors and 
responders may have limited access to internet, cell 
phone, landline phone, and television services due 
to the combination of communication and power 
disruptions. 
Intergovernmental communication capabilities may 
be significantly degraded, which may limit their 
ability to coordinate. Responders may be unable to 
collect information and provide situational aware-
ness, which may delay the delivery of lifesaving and 
life-sustaining assistance. Survivors may have limited 
access to news, social media, and other informa-
tional outlets that could help them determine what 
to do and where to go. Rumors may fill the void 
created by the absence of traditional information 
channels. 
There are over a thousand telecommunications 
facilities in the impacted area of Washington and 
Figure 105. Shaking form the 1989 M6.9 Loma Prieta 
earthquake damaged radio transmission towers in 
California. Even radio and cell towers that do not 
experience severe damage may still be un-operational after 
the quake if antennae, cables, or other hardware become 
unaligned or damaged. Photo: USGS.
Oregon. Roughly two-thirds of these facilities may 
suffer medium to high damage from the initial 
earthquake. As shown in Table 41, the majority of 
communications facilities in Washington’s I-5 corri-
dor may suffer medium to high damage. The shak-
ing may rattle equipment off of cell towers, dislodge 
central control boards and damage central com-
munications offices. Communication facilities that 
suffer no or low damage may also be un-operational 
due to antennae being thrown out of alignment or 
the breaking of cables connecting these facilities. 







Slight damage to the commu-
nication facility building, or 
loss of the center’s ability to 
provide services for up to a 
few days due to loss of elec-
tric power and backup power. 
The facility may be functional 
with minor repairs.
Moderate to severe damage to 
communication facility buildings, 
many digital switching boards 
dislodged, resulting in malfunction. 
The central office may be without 
service for a few days due to loss 
of electric power or loss of backup 
power, typically due to overload.
Severe to complete damage 
to the communication facility 
building, with most switching 
boards dislodged, resulting in 
malfunction. The damage to digi-
tal switching boards may beyond 
repair.   
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C o m m u n i c at i o n  S y s t e m s  ( c o n t. )
In areas experiencing power outages, communica-
tions facilities may be forced to operate on backup 
generators. However, these backup power systems 
typically last for only eight to twelve hours. Refu-
eling these systems may be a challenge; damaged 
roadways may make it difficult for crews to reach 
communications towers. Personnel shortages may 
also limit the number of teams sent out to repair fa-
cilities. As facilities running on backup power begin 
to go offline, communications may further dete-
riorate. The accumulation of numerous points of 
failure may result in widespread failure far beyond 
the impacted area. 
People who still have cell or landline service calling 
loved ones or emergency services may overwhelm 
the remaining lines, causing them to jam up or 
crash completely. In total, up to ten million people 
across the region may lose access to standard com-
munication services. 
Figure 106. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami compounded 
communication infrastructure damage already caused by 
the earthquake, including completely knocking over cell 
towers. Widespread damage to communication systems can 
delay the response time of emergency services and leave 
survivors without crucial information. Source: USGS.
Coastal communications may be especially degrad-
ed due to damage to communication facilities and 
damage to electric and transportation infrastructure 
in the areas of highest shaking. Most coastal cell 
towers and central control buildings may suffer 
high damage from the violent shaking and may be 
completely inaccessible for repair. Even if commu-
nications buildings themselves withstand the earth-
quake, unsecured equipment may be tossed to the 
ground and central control boards may dislodge, 
resulting in malfunction. Some communication 
facilities may be completely destroyed by the tsu-
nami waves. Communications in these areas may 
be limited to radio and satellite phones. Figure 106 
illustrates the type of damage the force of a tsunami 
wave can do to the steel support columns of a cell 
tower. Many coastal broadcast facilities that pro-
vide AM/FM radio and television services may also 
suffer high damage and may be unable to provide 
service. Even facilities sustaining low damage may 
experience service disruptions due to misdirected 
or downed antennae. As a result, broadcast services 
may be disrupted for inland populations as well. 
The potential loss of broadcast services may severe-
ly limit the ability of state and local authorities to 
disseminate emergency information to affected areas 
through the EAS national public warning system. 
While television and FM broadcast may be available 
in some areas of the I-5 corridor, their signals will be 
unable to reach past the coastal mountain range to 
provide service to survivors in the heavily damaged 
coastal regions. With AM radio’s longer broadcast 
range, survivors with power, or those who attempt 
to listen in their vehicles, may be able to receive AM 
radio signals.
For local, state, and tribal governments with back-
up reporting and communications systems, limited 
communication may be possible up until the point 
when fuel for backup generators runs out.
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Undersea transpacific cables are the primary commu-
nications links connecting both Alaska and East Asia 
to the contiguous United States. Damaged transpa-
cific cables may cause disruption in communication to 
and from East Asian countries, as well as to and from 
Alaska.
Underground landslides and the shifting of the ocean 
floor may sever undersea cables that traverse the off-
shore regions of the Cascadia Subduction Zone. The 
remaining cable systems on the northern transpacific 
routes landing in Puget Sound and the Oregon coast 
may see some disruptions, but the southern routes 
through California may remain functional. 
With the loss of undersea cable capacity, communica-
tions systems may face abnormally high congestion. 
While alternative routes using satellite microwave 
communications may exist, the bandwidth is limit-
ed. The restoration of these cables may take several 
months. 
On land, regional long-haul fiber optic cables may be 
severed by landslides or the collapse of the bridges 
they span, which may cause regional and nationwide 
W A s h i n g t o n  A n d  o r e g o n :
l o n g - h A u l  f i B e r  o P t i C  C A B l e s
delays in internet and long-distance services as the 
network attempts to reroute around the impacted 
area.
Figure 107. Internet and phone providers believe that 
a small earthquake severed this underwater cable and 
caused a phone and data outage in the San Juan Islands. 
Following an earthquake survivors may not be able to use 
undamaged landlines as the volume of emergency calls 
will likely overwhelm surviving infrastructure capabilities. 
Photo: KING.
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The majority of communications infrastructure on 
the coast may be severely damaged and inaccessible 
for repair. Facilities along the immediate coastline 
will likely be destroyed by the force of the tsunami 
wave. Communications in these areas may be limit-
ed to radio frequency and satellite phones.
W a s h i n g t o n :  C o m m u n i c at i o n s  S y s t e m s
As shown in Table 42, most of the communication 
facilities in eastern Washington may suffer less 
physical damage from the earthquake. However, 
the lower availability of power may limit the capa-
bility of these facilities to provide service. Figures 
108 and 109 plot the location of cell towers and 
broadcast television stations in Washington.
Table 42. Distribution of damage states for Washington state communications facilities,
























Slight damage to 
the communication 
facility building, or 
loss of the center’s 
ability to provide 
services for up to 
a few days due 
to loss of electric 
power and backup 
power. The facility 














Moderate to severe 
damage to communi-
cation facility buildings, 
many digital switching 
boards dislodged, 
resulting in malfunction. 
The central office may 
be without service for a 
few days due to loss of 
electric power or loss of 
backup power, typically 
due to overload.
Severe to com-
plete damage to 
the communication 
facility building, 
with most switching 
boards dislodged, 
resulting in malfunc-
tion. The damage 
to digital switching 















































































































































The majority of communications infrastructure on 
the coast may be severely damaged and inaccessible 
for repair (see Table 43). Facilities along the imme-
diate coastline will likely be destroyed by the force 
of the tsunami wave. Communications in these 
areas may be limited to radio frequency and satellite 
phones.
O r e g o n :  C o m m u n i c at i o n s  S y s t e m s
Most of the communication facilities in eastern 
Oregon may suffer less physical damage from the 
earthquake. However, the lower availability of 
power may limit the capability of these facilities to 
provide service. Figures 110 and 111 plot the loca-
tion of cell towers and broadcast television stations 
in Oregon.
Table 43. Distribution of damage states for Oregon communications facilities,
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B u i l d i n g s
As with other types of structures, the performance 
of a building during the earthquake will depend on 
when it was built, where it is located, the strength 
and flexibility of its materials, and how long the 
ground shakes. For tall buildings, large-magnitude 
earthquakes pose a particular challenge. High-rises 
and other tall structures vibrate at a lower frequency 
than shorter buildings. Because the frequency of a 
large earthquake’s seismic waves is also low, some 
tall structures may resonate with the waves. This 
will amplify the intensity of the shaking and may 
increase the damage.
Some buildings should hold up fairly well. Struc-
tures that were designed and built to meet current 
seismic codes may sustain damage, but should not 
collapse. These may be usable after the earthquake, 
although they may lack utilities. Many houses in the 
Pacific Northwest are wood-frame structures. This 
type of building is lightweight, flexible, and unlike-
ly to collapse during the quake, although it may 
shift off of its foundation if not bolted to it (this 
is a major concern for houses built prior to 1976). 
Connections to utilities may also break, and fallen 
chimneys are quite common, as were seen during 
the Nisqually earthquake in 2001.
Other buildings will perform very badly. Unrein-
forced masonry buildings (URMs), for example, 
predate seismic codes. Built of brick or concrete 
without steel reinforcement, they are prone to 
collapse during strong earthquakes, particularly 
when the shaking lasts for several minutes. URMs 
are often the cause of earthquake-related fatali-
ties. Because of the danger such buildings pose, 
some governments are taking steps to eliminate or 
strengthen URMs. California state law requires local 
governments in seismic hazard zones to inventory 
URMs and adopt mitigation programs aimed at 
reducing the risk of collapse. Complete inventories 
have been done only in California, but URMs are 
common throughout the Northwest: Oregon has 
an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 statewide, with about 
1,800 in the city of Portland alone. Seattle, which 
has about 1,000 URMs, and has experienced three 
damaging earthquakes in the last 64 years, is con-
sidering adoption of a mandatory retrofit program 
similar to California’s. 
A Cascadia earthquake may cause nonstructural 
damage even in buildings that were built or retro-
fitted to meet higher structural seismic standards. 
Strong shaking can knock fittings and equipment 
loose and move anything that is not securely bolted 
down. Suspended ceilings, fire sprinkler systems, 
elevators, partition walls, air handling units, and hot 
water tanks are just a few of the vulnerable compo-
nents.
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In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, 
as many as one million residential buildings may 
be damaged by the initial earthquake. This dam-
age may range from small cracks at the corners of 
doors, windows, and in masonry chimneys, to the 
complete failure of walls, load bearing systems, and 
foundations, leading to partial or complete collapse 
of the building.  In addition to structural damage, 
millions of homes may sustain a range of nonstruc-
tural damage, such as fallen bookshelves, televisions, 
computers, lights, dishes, and ventilation ducts. The 
photos below illustrate the range of structural and 
nonstructural damage.
R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i l d i n g s
Figure 112. The interior of residential dwellings can be 
damaged during seismic events, such as this living room 
following the 1994 M 6.7 Northridge earthquake. Large 
pieces of furniture, fire sprinkler systems, suspended 
ceilings, air conditioning units and hot water tanks are 
among the vulnerable household elements. Photo: Jonney 
Wiss. 
Figure 113. The 1983 M 6.2 Coalinga earthquake caused 
the cripple walls of wood-frame houses to fail, resulting in 
the house sliding off its foundation. Wood frame houses are 
flexible enough that collapse is unlikely for most of them, 
but many built prior to 1976 are at risk of shifting off of 
their foundations. Photo: Karl V. Steinbrugge.
Figure 114. The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake shifted this 
house over two feet off its foundation causing the structure 
to detach from the concrete stairway and collapsing all four 
shear walls. Photo: J.K Nakata, USGS.
Figure 115. The tsunami following the 2011 East Japan 
earthquake obliterated many houses it inundated, stripping 
the walls off some and sweeping others completely off of 
their foundations. Similar tsunami damage in the region 
could affect over 45,000 buildings, most of them residential. 
Photo: EPA/Alex Hofford.
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In Washington, as many as half a million residential 
buildings may be damaged by the initial earthquake.
The population centers along the I-5 corridor may 
have the highest number of damaged residential 
buildings; over 400,000 residential buildings may 
suffer some level of structural damage. The majority 
of damaged residential buildings may only sustain 
minor structural damage, and may be immediately 
inhabitable after the earthquake. Roughly 5 percent 
of the damaged buildings may sustain moderate 
structural damage requiring repair before it is safe to 
occupy.viii 
The highest level of building damage may be along 
the coast and west of the coastal mountain chain. 
As many as 70,000 residential buildings may be 
damaged by the earthquake. Roughly a quarter of 
the damages to buildings may be severe enough as 
to render the structure uninhabitable without major 
repairs.  
The tsunami will likely damage as many as 20,000 
residential buildings along the coast, including 
roughly half of the residential buildings in Grays 
Harbor and Pacific Counties.
The length of time it takes to repair these structures 
may depend on the location of the building, damage 
to surrounding infrastructure, and the damage state 
of the structure.
W a s h i n g t o n :  R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i l d i n g s
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In Oregon, as many as 440,000 residential buildings 
may be damaged by the earthquake. 
The population centers along the I-5 corridor may 
have the highest number of damaged residential 
buildings; over 300,000 residential buildings may 
suffer some level of structural damage. The majority 
of damaged residential buildings may only sustain 
minor structural damage, and may be immediately 
inhabitable after the earthquake. Roughly 5 percent 
of the damaged buildings may sustain moderate 
structural damage requiring repair before it is safe to 
occupy.viii 
The highest level of building damage may be along 
the coast, where as many as 100,000 residential 
buildings may be damaged by the earthquake. 
Roughly a quarter of the damages to buildings may 
be severe enough as to render the structure uninhab-
itable without major repairs.  The tsunami will likely 
damage as many as 20,000 residential buildings 
along the coast.
The length of time it takes to repair these structures 
may depend on the location of the building, damage 
to surrounding infrastructure, and the damage state 
of the structure.
O r e g o n :  R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i l d i n g s
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S h e lt e r s
In the immediate aftermath of the Cascadia Subduc-
tion Zone event, as many as one million people may 
need short-term sheltering. Most displaced survivors 
may seek shelter because their homes are no lon-
ger safe to occupy, or they may be unable to reach 
their homes due to impassable roads. Many of these 
survivors will shelter-in-place, that is, seek shelter 
with family and neighbors, while many others will 
seek out government and Red Cross managed for-
mal emergency shelters. Visitors to the region will 
also need short-term sheltering. At the same time, 
roughly two-thirds of emergency shelter buildings 
may suffer medium to high damage. While some of 
these shelters may suffer moderate building damage, 
others may suffer damage severe enough as to render 
the building uninhabitable. Others may need to 
operate without power and water. 
The large volume of displaced survivors seeking 
shelter will likely overcrowd the remaining work-
ing shelters, raising the possibility of public health 
threats emerging from unsanitary conditions likely 
to develop in these crowded shelters. 
Table 44 shows the approximate number of people 
in need of shelter in Washington and Oregon. 










370,000 45,000 415,000 1,100,000
500,000 20,000 520,000 1,300,000
870,000 65,000 915,000 2,400,000
Total
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